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Abstract—The world is resorting to the Internet of
Things (IoT) for ease of control and monitoring of smart
devices. The ubiquitous use of IoT ranges from Industrial
Control Systems (ICS) to e-Health, e-Commerce, smart
cities, supply chain management, smart cars, Cyber Phys-
ical Systems (CPS) and a lot more. Such reliance on IoT is
resulting in a significant amount of data to be generated,
collected, processed and analyzed. The big data analytics
is no doubt beneficial for business development. However,
at the same time, numerous threats to the availability and
privacy of the user data, message and device integrity,
the vulnerability of IoT devices to malware attacks and the
risk of physical compromise of devices pose a significant
danger to the sustenance of IoT. This paper thus endeavors
to highlight most of the known threats at various layers of
the IoT architecture with a focus on the anatomy of malware
attacks. We present a detailed attack methodology adopted
by some of the most successful malware attacks on IoT
including ICS and CPS. We also deduce an attack strategy
of a Distributed Denial of Service attack through IoT botnet
followed by requisite security measures. In the end, we
propose a composite guideline for the development of an
IoT security framework based on industry best practices
and also highlight lessons learned, pitfalls and the open
research challenges.
Index Terms—Threats to the IoT, Internet of Things,
malware attacks on the Internet of Things, attack methodol-
ogy, security and privacy, IoT security framework, security
guidelines.
I. INTRODUCTION
Millions of embedded devices are being used today
in safety and security critical applications such as In-
dustrial Control Systems (ICS), Vehicle Ad-Hoc Networks
(VANET), disaster management and critical infrastructure
[1]. A massive number of these devices have been inter-
connected to each other and further connected to the
internet to form an Internet of Things (IoT). IoT based
services have seen an exponential economic growth in
last five years especially in telehealth and manufacturing
applications and are expected to create about $1.1- $2.5
Trillion contribution in the global economy by 2020 [2].
It is estimated that by 2020, the number of IoT con-
nected devices will exceed to 30 billion from 9.9 million
in 2013 [3] and M2M (Machine-to-Machine) traffic flows
are also expected to constitute up to 45% of the whole
internet traffic [4]. However, due to interconnection with
the internet, IoT devices are vulnerable to various attacks
[1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. Moreover, it is believed that IoT
devices are being manufactured rapidly without giving
much attention to security challenges and the requisite
threats [11].
According to [12], more than 85% of enterprises around
the world will be turning to IoT devices in one form
or the other, and 90% of these organizations are not
sure about the security of their IoT devices. Similarly,
Joseph Steinberg in [13] has listed many appliances
that can spy on people in their own homes. A recent
study carried out by HP [14] also revealed that 70% of
the devices connected to the internet are vulnerable to
numerous attacks. Moreover, development of smart cars
is also on the rise in the world, in which vehicle on-board
computer systems are connected to the internet thus
making them vulnerable to Cyber-attacks [7]. In addition,
the legacy industrial systems such as manufacturing, en-
ergy, transportation, chemical, water and sewage control
systems (connected by IoT to achieve better monitor-
ing, control, and conditional maintenance) have greater
security risks [15]. Attacks on industrial systems are
not just a threat instead it is a reality, as two Russian
security researchers found vulnerabilities in more than
60,000 internet connected control systems that could be
exploited to take full control of the compromised systems
running energy, chemical, and transportation applications
Fig. 1: Generalized IoT Architecture
[16]. Furthermore, it is expected that by the end of 2020,
more than 25% of corporate attacks would be because
of compromised IoT devices [17]. Similarly, the success-
ful launch of sophisticated cyber-attacks like Mirai [18],
Ransomware [19], Shamoon-2 [20] and DuQu-2 [21] on
ICS and other critical infrastructure in recent past have
rendered existing IoT protocols ineffective.
A. Related Work
Till date many reviews and survey papers [8, 10, 22,
23, 24, 25, 26] have been published to highlight the secu-
rity issues of IoT. However, they do not cover the full spec-
trum of IoT security. A detailed comparison of existing
work is shown in Table-I. Most of the current work focuses
on few aspects and leaves the rest. For instance, [8]
refers to limited security issues at different IoT layers and
discusses all theoretical/non-industrial security methods
without defining an overall security model. Similarly, [10]
mostly enumerates the DoS (Denial of Service) attacks
on various layers of WSN (Wireless Sensor Network)
and some security vulnerabilities in RFID technology.
It does not give examples of such attacks illustrating
the vulnerabilities exploited and also lacks recommended
security measures to protect against mentioned attacks.
Whereas, [22] highlights some generalized IoT security
gaps concerning lack of standardization and regulations
by discussing pros and cons of some existing security
frameworks such as COBIT, ISO/IEC 27002:2005. It pro-
poses an integrated security framework with generalized
recommendations on hardware and protocol security with
an urge to develop IoT specific security standards.
Authors in [23], also briefly discuss the security and
privacy issues in IoT with focus on some open problems.
The paper broadly covers some of the generalized se-
curity and privacy threats including internal and external
attacks, DoS attacks, physical attacks and attacks on
privacy. Authors also highlight some of the security and
privacy challenges to IoT such as user privacy, data
protection/authentication, identity/trust management, au-
thorization and access control. Whereas, [24] covers the
security and open research issues related to IoT com-
munication protocols only. Similarly, [25] briefly highlights
some security and privacy issues of five smart-home de-
vices and proposes an SDN-based network level security
mechanism that monitor and control network operations
of each IoT device.
In another notable work [26], authors present an IoT
security architecture comprising three layers, i.e., per-
ception, transport and application layer. The paper com-
prehensively covers security issues of IoT with a focus
on RFID and WSN. They also discuss access network
technologies including WiFi and 3G. Although authors
have amply covered some security issues related to IoT,
yet there is a roam of improvement by including examples
of practical attacks/vulnerabilities in IoT such as smart-
home and wearable IoT devices. There is a further re-
quirement of adding a comprehensive security framework
for IoT. Resultantly, there is a need of a comprehensive
illustration of practical threats to IoT and formulation of a
set of security guidelines that should cater for varying
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standards of IoT devices and recommend a common
framework for end-to-end IoT security [17].
Contributions of the paper. To cover the gaps in current
literature (as shown in Table-1), the major contribution
of this paper is to present an “All in one package”
that comprehensively covers most of the aspects of IoT
security. The paper develops logically by first introducing
a generalized IoT architecture and a detailed IoT protocol
stack showing technologies, protocols and functionalities
at various layers of IoT. It amply covers a range of gener-
alized as well as specific threats at different layers of IoT
with examples of such attacks on IoT systems/devices
at most of the places. We also present a consolidated
list of threats to IoT along with the vulnerabilities that
can be exploited to convert these threats into successful
attacks. Another aspect that differs this paper from its
predecessors is its due diligence on malware attacks
and their attack methodology. We also deduce an attack
strategy of a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack
through IoT botnet followed by necessary security mea-
sures. This paper also presents a comprehensive set of
security guidelines based on industry best practices that
can help IoT standardization bodies to design minimum
security standards based on types of IoT applications.
Finally, some open research challenges related to IoT
security are discussed.
B. Paper Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section-2
presents a detailed description of threats to IoT. Attack
methodology of some of the most successful malware
attacks is described in Section-3, while the gap analysis,
attack strategy of a DDoS attack on IoT devices, and
guidelines for the security framework are discussed in
Section-4. Summary, lessons learnt and pitfalls are illus-
trated in Section-5. In Section-6, we present some open
research challenges, and finally, the paper is concluded
with some description of the future work in Section-7.
II. THREATS TO THE IOT
This section presents a detailed description of some
generalized and various specific threats to different layers
of IoT architecture. However, before we do the threat
modeling, it is essential to explain the IoT architecture
and some important terms that would be used frequently
in the later text. Firstly, IoT systems and IoT ecosys-
tem would be encountered often. Where, IoT system
refers to a typical IoT application like smart-home, smart-
grid, smart-vehicle, smart-watch, etc., and IoT ecosystem
points to the IoT (with all its applications) as a whole.
Secondly, IoT architecture concerns the way different
objects such as sensors, actuators, gateways, network
and application servers are arranged and communicate
with each other.
A. IoT Architecture
Currently, there is a lack of consistency and standard-
ization in IoT solutions across the globe due to which
there are issues related to interoperability, compatibility,
and manageability [27]. Likewise, non-uniformity in the
presentation of IoT Architecture and layered protocol
stack was observed in the literature review [8, 24, 28,
29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36]. Such as, [8] presents IoT
layers showing the meagre detail of functionality and the
protocols. Similarly, [24] just focuses on communication
protocols at various IoT layers. Whereas, [28] displays
a table of elements and technologies that together form
an IoT. Therefore, it is believed that due to this non-
standardization, the world has not yet been able to agree
on a single IoT reference model [28]. To reduce this non-
uniformity, we present a consolidated generalized IoT
architecture and a layered IoT protocol stack shown in
Figure-1 and Figure-2 respectively. An IoT ecosystem
may comprise different types of devices, which can be
deployed in any of the following topologies, i.e., star, clus-
tered tree, and mesh. “Things” are usually connected to a
gateway device using various IoT communication proto-
cols such as 802.15.4, LoRaWAN, SigFox, ZigBee, WiFi,
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE), Near Field Communication
and Radio Frequency Identification (RFID). The gateway
device is connected to an application or a network server
via 3G/4G, LTE (Long-Term Evolution), Optical Fiber
Cable (OFC), satellite link, etc. The network/application
servers (can be located in the cloud) provide different
data analytic services to its users and third parties includ-
ing government and private organizations. The processed
data is turned into useful information in the form of health
statistics, smart home autonomous services, business
intelligence, industrial automation, environmental moni-
toring, livable urban communities and smart city sharing
services.
As far as IoT protocol stack is concerned, the first layer
is the physical/perception layer that consists of sensors,
actuators, computational hardware, identification and ad-
dressing of the things. As the name suggests, its purpose
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Fig. 2: IoT Protocol Stack
is to perceive the data from the environment. All the
data collection and data sensing is done at this layer
[37]. Some other functions of physical layer include fre-
quency selection, modulation-demodulation, encryption-
decryption, transmission and reception of data. The
challenges faced by this layer are energy consumption,
security, and interoperability [27]. The second layer is
the MAC (Medium Access Control)/Adaptation/Network
layer, which is responsible for receiving data from sensing
devices and then forward it to the application layer for
processing, analytics, and smart services. The network
layer also faces specific issues concerning scalability,
network availability, power consumption and security [27].
The third layer is the application/services layer which
provides smart services to the customers and also feeds
processed/aggregated data to the semantics layer. The
challenges being faced at this layer are related to han-
dling, storage, and processing of data received from the
sensors, security/privacy of user information and con-
formity to industrial/government regulations. E.g., Health
Insurance Portability Accountability Act (HIPAA) in the
United States and Personal Information Protection and
Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) in Canada, protect
the users' rights concerning their health and personal
information. The fourth and the last layer is semantics
which can also be termed as a business management
layer as it manages all the activities of an IoT system.
It implies the use of cognitive technologies to provide
certain high-end services such as data analysis, busi-
ness intelligence, strategic decision-making and business
modelling.
Although, by now we are clear about what IoT is, however
there are many areas in which IoT is different than
tradition networks (including LANs and internet), which
are being discussed in succeeding paras.
B. IoT vs Traditional Networks
Before discussing IoT threats, it is important to un-
derstand the differences between IoT and traditional
networks, as these differences influence the development
of requisite security and privacy solutions for IoT systems.
The significant difference between conventional networks
and IoT is the level of the resourcefulness of end devices
[26]. IoT usually comprises resource constraint embed-
ded devices such as RFID and sensor nodes. These de-
vices have low memory, low computing power, small disk
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space and require low power consumption. Whereas, the
traditional internet is composed of computers, servers
and smartphones that have plentiful resources. Hence,
the traditional networks can be supported by complex
and multi-factor security protocols without any resource
consideration. In contrast to this, IoT systems require
lightweight security algorithms that maintain a balance
between security and resource consumption such as
battery life.
IoT devices mostly connect to the internet or gateway
devices through slower and less secure wireless commu-
nication media such as 802.15.4, 802.11a/b/g/n/p, LoRa,
ZigBee, NB-IoT and SigFox. Resultantly, IoT systems
are prone to data leakage and other privacy issues.
Whereas, in the traditional internet, end devices com-
municate through more secure and faster wired/wireless
media such as fiber optics, DSL/ADSL, WiFi, 4G and LTE.
Another difference is that traditional network devices have
almost the same OS and data format, but in the case
of IoT because of application-specific functionality and
lack of OS, there are different data contents and formats.
Hence, because of this diversity, it is difficult to develop a
standard security protocol that fits all types of IoT devices
and systems. As a result, a wide range of IoT threats are
still at loose and threaten the security and privacy of the
users.
If we look at the security design, traditional networks are
secured by a blend of static network perimeter defense
based on firewalls, IDS/IPS and the end devices are
secured by host-based approaches such as anti-virus
and security/software patches. Whereas, the host-based
security approach cannot be applied to the resource
constraint IoT devices. Similarly, traditional perimeter de-
fense mechanism cannot secure IoT devices, since these
devices are deployed deep in the network. Hence, it is
concluded by authors in [38] that IoT devices cannot be
protected only by host-based solutions.
C. Generalized Threats
It is estimated that with the rise in number of things
connected to IoT systems to swarming billions of devices
by 2020, the potential vulnerabilities will also increase
[22]. Hence, the increase in vulnerabilities due to non-
standardization of IoT technologies may give rise to
security incidents in IoT systems. Some of the most com-
mon security issues in IoT are highlighted in succeeding
sections.
1) Security and Privacy Issues: During a security
audit conducted by [39], numerous smart devices were
checked for security breaches. As per findings of the se-
curity audit, almost 90% of these devices gather personal
information about the users in some form or the other.
This unauthorized storage of information is vulnerable to
data security, privacy and integrity attacks. Researchers
in [9] and [22] have also rendered security and privacy
issues a threat to data confidentiality and user privacy.
Moreover, lack of reliable authentication mechanism in
IoT devices is also a contributing factor in weak IoT
security [10]. Additionally, the lack of data encryption
and network access control measures enable an attacker
to pose a real threat to user privacy as a result of
eavesdropping and traffic analysis [40].
2) Threats to eHealth IoT Devices: Biomedical Sen-
sor Network (BSN) is a specialized case of WSN in
which sensors are used to monitor patients' health and
also facilitate chronic disease self-care [41]. BSN has
dynamic network topology due to mobile nodes, power
constraints and low bandwidth IoT communication proto-
cols. Therefore, BSN is vulnerable to numerous attacks
including DoS, eavesdropping, masquerading, and un-
authorized disclosure of personal health information. A
successful attack can be life-threatening, and can also
cause loss of data, misuse of access, loss of personal
information, manipulation of data and even in some cases
non-availability of critical health services.
3) Device Integrity: The deployment and successful
operation of IoT in critical infrastructures like smart grids,
healthcare, intelligent traffic systems, smart vehicles and
smart homes are highly dependent on the reliability of
devices and the data transmitted between these de-
vices [8]. However, IoT end devices mostly operate in
a trustless environment without any physical security.
Hence, these devices are subject to physical attacks in-
cluding invasive hardware attacks, side-channel attacks,
and reverse-engineering attacks [42]. In addition, cyber-
attacks incorporating compromised IoT devices as bots
such as Mirai DDoS Attack, are a significant threat to
corporate IoT [43].
4) Software/Code Integrity: Software integrity includ-
ing the integrity of the operating system, applications, and
configurations of IoT devices, is a key element to guar-
antee security and privacy of the “Things”. Recently a
practical manifestation of such an attack was experienced
by the world, named “Mirai” [44]. This attack created a
botnet by hacking into thousands of IoT devices includ-
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ing CCTV cameras and DVRs, by exploiting a firmware
weakness and then directed these devices to launch a
DDoS attack on a DNS (Domain Name System) service
provider named DYN.
It is believed that the lack of anti-virus/malware detection
mechanism in IoT leads to attacks on the integrity of
the code/software of an end device [8, 9]. The mobile
applications are another source of malware in smart de-
vices that further corrupt the computer networks through
infected emails, documents, and direct connection. In
2016, approximately one million Google accounts were
hacked due to an Android malware called “Gooligan”.
The malware propagated through eightysix seemingly
legitimate applications [17]. Therefore, IoT devices need
to be protected against malware attacks such as Trojans,
viruses, and other runtime attacks [9].
5) Issues Concerning Communication Protocols:
Further challenges in security design of IoT/CPS arise
from the fact that most of the current wireless commu-
nication protocols adhere to the OSI layered protocol
architecture and the physical layer encryption is not com-
plemented with additional security mechanisms in the
upper layers of the communication [45]. A MITM (Man-
in-the-Middle) attack launched by spoofing the address
resolution protocol (ARP) at MAC layer is an example
of such a security breach. Moreover, researchers in [46]
have identified that cross-layer and hybrid security issues
are open research challenges in wireless communication.
These issues can be easily extended toward IoT and
CPS. Same has been demonstrated through various se-
curity breaches such as maliciously gaining unauthorized
access to a Mitsubishi vehicle through a brute-force hack
of the pre-shared WiFi key, exfiltration of private/sensitive
data from a computer through a covert FM channel [47],
and hacking of wireless controlled implantable medical
device [48].
Similarly, cellular technologies such as UMTS, GSM, and
LTE also suffer from specific security issues [49]. Due
to open implementation of radio baseband stacks, the
mobile networks have an added threat of hacking and
cyber-attacks. Moreover, GSM and UMTS networks are
vulnerable to “IMSI Catching” by an active attacker. In
addition, there is a time delay in setting security contexts
while a UE (User Equipment) is connected to the base
station. Such a delay may prove fatal for delay-sensitive
applications, e.g., autonomous cars, smart medical in-
struments, etc. Mobile networks are also vulnerable to
DoS attacks launched by mobile bots [49]. The mobile
bots may attack MME (Mobile Management Entity) and
HSS (Home Subscriber Server). Correspondingly, radio
interface jamming is the DoS attack specific to wireless
communication. A smart jamming attack can be launched
against 3GPP (3rd Generation Partnership Project) spec-
ified mobile networks by using mobile botnets, in which
control channels essential for the overall operation of the
radio interface can be selectively blocked. DoS attacks
are even a threat to 5G networks.
Furthermore, the short-range wireless technologies like
Bluetooth and Zigbee are not suitable for applications that
require long communication range with low bandwidth.
Although, cellular technology does provide long coverage
for M2M communication, but require more power [50].
Therefore, since 2015, LPWAN (Low Power Wide Area
Network) technology is considered to be a suitable tech-
nology for the applications that require wide area cover-
age, low energy consumption, QoS (Quality of Service),
low data transmission rate, low latency and low costs
[50, 51].
Koushanfar et al. also illustrate that communication pro-
tocols are subject to protocol attacks, including MITM
and DoS attacks [52]. A manifestation of one of the DoS
attacks on the wireless communication protocol 802.11b
is presented in [53]. The author highlights the vulnerability
in the exchange of disassociation message between the
client and the station. It is identified that the message
is sent without any authentication. Hence, it enables an
attacker to initiate a disassociation message on behalf
of other users to stop them from connecting to the
network. Correspondingly, this DoS can result in a severe
availability issue in case of a CPS/IoT system [54]. It
can further be deduced that almost all the communica-
tion protocols such as 802.15.4, Zigbee and LoRaWAN
provide conventional cryptographic security assurances
such as confidentiality, data integrity, data authenticity,
replay protection and non-repudiation [24, 30]. However,
the cryptographic security embedded in communication
protocols is not meant to protect against node compro-
mise and malware attacks.
There is another upcoming communication technology,
being developed by IEEE 802.1 TSN (Time Sensitive Net-
works) TG (Task Group) for applications requiring Ultra-
Low Latency (ULL). TSN promises a secure end-to-end
network connection between a sender and receiver node
through a time-sensitive capable network [55]. Similarly,
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IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) is also working
on DetNet (Deterministic Networks) to interconnect the
isolated OT (Operational Technology), i.e., CPS with IT
networks [56]. However, such an interconnection will
expose the CPS to various internal and external attacks.
Moreover, being a work in progress, security aspects
require due consideration to mitigate the internal and
external threats ranging from detNet flow modification
to path manipulation and attacks on Time Synchronized
Mechanisms.
Coming over to the core network communication me-
dia, mostly OFC interconnects multiple corporate data
centres or an ISP with the internet gateway. An optical
fiber channel may directly impact an IoT system, e.g.,
a smart home gateway device is connected to an ISP
through a Fiber-To-The-Home (FTTH) connection in or-
der to provide internet-based remote access to various
services to the owner of the house and same connec-
tion can be used by the vendor for maintenance/remote
monitoring of the system. Optical channels are vulnerable
to eavesdropping, jamming and attacks to the availability
[57]. An attacker can eavesdrop on classified/private data
by tapping into an optical fiber for unencrypted channels
[58] or by cracking the encryption keys that are isolated
from the payload and are transferred over the Network
Management System (NMS) [59]. Whereas, jamming
attacks can be launched by introducing in-band and out-
of-band cross-talk [60], and by exploiting vulnerabilities
of the alien wavelengths [61]. Some other factors that
may degrade an optical channel by launching signal in-
sertion attacks include Mixed Line Rate (MLR) networks,
On-Off-Keying (OOK) amplitude modulation and Cross-
Polarization Modulation (XPolM) [62].
6) Hardware Vulnerabilities : IoT devices are being
commercially developed with more emphasis on device
functionality rather than security. Hence, security features
are often added in an ad-hoc manner. Therefore, com-
mercial IoT devices have residual hardware vulnerabili-
ties such as open physical interfaces and boot process
susceptibilities which can be remotely exploited [63].
Whereas, the reliable and safe operation of IoT systems
depends on the integrity of the underlying devices, in
particular, the integrity of their code and data against
malicious modifications [64].
7) DoS Attacks: Due to constraint resources such
as low memory, low computation power and low battery
consumption, IoT devices are vulnerable to resource
exhaustion attacks [23]. These attacks include jamming
of communication channels, extensive unauthorized or
malicious utilization of critical IoT resources such as
bandwidth, memory, CPU time, disk space and change
of node configuration. All of these attacks will most likely
affect the operational functionality of IoT devices and non-
availability of their services to the respective users.
8) DDoS Attacks: The analysis of past cyber inci-
dents infer that the vulnerabilities of IoT devices make
them an ideal platform to launch DDoS attacks. It has
also been disclosed by [65] that 96 percent of the devices
involved in DDoS attacks were IoT devices. Whereas, 3
percent were home routers and 1 percent were compro-
mised Linux Servers.
9) Security Challenges Specific to WSN: Chen et al.
in [66], have classified threats unique to WSN in following
categories: interruption, interception, modification, and
fabrication attacks. Moreover, unauthorized insertion of
malicious messages in the network has also been high-
lighted by [29]. Authors in [26] point out that due to wire-
less communication media, the process of information
collection/sharing can be subjected to eavesdropping,
malicious routing and message tampering.
10) Security Issues of RFID and Bluetooth Devices:
Due to lack of physical protection and wireless nature
of RFID communication, RFID tag data is vulnerable
to confidentiality and integrity attacks [29]. Some other
security issues include lack of uniform coding, conflict
collision, privacy protection and trust management be-
tween RFID tag and the reader and between reader
and the base station [26]. Similarly, use of unpatched or
old version Bluetooth devices can cause connectivity to
unauthorized/malicious devices thus exposing private or
security-critical data [29].
11) User Unawareness: Users are one of the most
common attack vectors. Due to lack of security training
and awareness, employees are vulnerable to social engi-
neering, phishing, spear-phishing and accidental security
breaches. Hence, they unwittingly download malicious
codes by clicking infected links in the emails. In addition,
sharing of sensitive data over public networks through
mobile devices is another cause of security breaches. It is
therefore estimated that with the increase in smartphone
users, almost one-third of the mobile devices are at high
risk of exposing official data [17].
D. Threats at Different Layers of IoT Architecture
Table-II shows a list of numerous threats at various
layers of IoT architecture and the vulnerabilities that can
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Fig. 3: Classification of IoT Attacks based on their Impact on Deployment
be exploited to convert such risks into successful attacks.
Moreover, these attacks have also been classified based
upon their impact on IoT node deployment and network
architecture. As shown in Figure-3, the IoT attacks
affect the geographical (geo) placement/location and
level of physical security of IoT devices as per the
sensitivity of data and the critical infrastructure. Similarly,
selection of IoT communication protocol and network
topology is also derived by the threat environment and
the requirement of requisite security measures. E.g., if
there is a threat of jamming of wireless channels by
the attacker, the use of frequency hopping or a spread
spectrum technology would be an appropriate response.
Similarly, the decision on the network control by a single
entity or a distributed control, and other network security
paradigms such as the need of network segmentation
and network virtualization for better neutralization and
mitigation of IoT attacks are also derived by the extent
and types of IoT attacks. The detailed description of
these threats at different layers of IoT architecture is
presented in the succeeding sections.
1) Physical/Perception Layer: Some of the signifi-
cant threats at physical/perception layer include:
Eavesdropping on Wireless Communication. Attack-
ers can install devices similar to end nodes in an IoT
system to sniff wireless traffic and extract some valuable
information about users.
Loss of Power. A Battery drainage attack in which a
node is bombarded with a large no of legal requests thus
preventing it from going to sleep or energy saving mode.
Hardware Failure. IoT devices installed in ehealth, In-
telligent Transport Systems (ITS), smart cities and smart
grids can be termed as the lifeline to the users. Hardware
failure due to a manufacturing fault or as a result of a
cyber-attack may lead to substantial damage to the sys-
tem and physical impairment to the users [8]. In such an
endeavour, researchers from security consultancy Rapid-
7 [67] discovered that seven commercially available smart
devices are vulnerable to cyber-attacks. These devices
include the Philips In.Sight wireless baby monitor, iBaby
Monitor M3S/M6, Summer Infant Baby Zoom, TrendNet
WiFi Baby Cam, Lens Peek-a-View and a Gynoii device.
In some cases, attacks were as simple as guessing or
switching out sections of web addresses/URLs. In the
particular case of iBaby M6, it was possible to guess
the serial number of the device, the camera type, and
a user ID. These parameters were then used in the web
login URL to execute an authentication bypass access to
the device. In a similar attack, the researchers were able
to initiate video and audio streams in a Philips camera.
In general, there was no blacklisting or whitelisting of
IP addresses to control access to these URLs. The
researchers were also able to register a new user account
for the Summer Baby Zoom Camera by manipulating
the URL related to Summer Baby WiFi Monitor and
Internet Viewing System without any disclosure/alarm to
the legitimate users.
Malicious Data Injection by Forged Devices. Any
determined malicious attacker can introduce a forged
device in an IoT system to eavesdrop on the radio traffic,
inject fabricated messages or flood the radio channels
with fake messages to render the system unavailable to
the legitimate users [68].
Sybil Attack. In this attack, a malicious node may
present multiple identities by impersonating other nodes
or by generating new fake identities. In the worst case
scenario, multiple identities may be generated using a
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Fig. 4: Home Automation Device Setup
single physical device [69]. The attacker may present
all the Sybil Identities simultaneously or one by one at
different instances. A Sybil Attack may affect the outcome
of a voting-based fault tolerance system or a routing
protocol.
Disclosure of Critical Information. A malicious attacker
say a smart thief continually monitors the wireless sen-
sors traffic of a smart house. Even if the wireless data
is encrypted, the reduced data traffic may infer critical
information to the attacker that the house is empty.
Therefore, he can plan a robbery.
Side-Channel Attacks. These attacks are based on
side-channel information about the encryption device.
Such information is other than the plaintext or ciphertext
messages, i.e., data about processing time or power
consumption of the device in encrypting/decrypting var-
ious messages and during the computation of different
security protocols like Diffie Hellman (DH) key exchange
and Digital Signature Standard (DSS) protocols [70].
Device Compromise. In a practical manifestation of
such an attack, researchers in [71] compromised a smart
controller of a house (device setup is shown in Figure-
4) automation system through an open UART interface.
The complete attack sequence is also shown in the
Figure-5. Once the researchers gained access to the
device, they were able to view the start-up sequence.
They modified the boot parameters and gained low-level
access to the device. They also brute forced the root
password and launched network layer attacks such as
port scanning and network traffic analysis. In another
vulnerability assessment, the researchers were able to
modify the (ID) identity of a smart meter by compromising
the device through a JTAG (Joint Test Action Group)
interface. They re-enabled write access to an EEPROM
(Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-only Memory)
that stored the device ID. As a result of such an attack,
the spoofed device ID can be used to feed wrong power
consumption data to the smart meter reader.
Similarly, owing to the boot process vulnerabilities, the
compromise of boot sequence not only facilitates the
attackers in attacking other high-level layers but also in
taking control of the device. In an experimental setting
in [72], a similar attack was successfully executed on
Google Nest Learning Thermostat and Nike+ Fuelband
SE fitness tracker. The researchers exploited vulner-
abilities in the boot process of the Nest Thermostat
OS and also some weaknesses in the physical design.
The devices were compromised despite the availability
of default security features including WPA-2 personal
security on WiFi interface, TLS (Transport Layer Security)
1.2 for transmission of any log related data, access to
Nest Cloud using OAuth authentication tokens and use of
PKCS-7 certificates to ensure authentication and integrity
of update images.
Timing Attacks and Hardware Exploitation. Debug-
ging ports (UART (Universal Asynchronous Receiver-
Transmitter), JTAG, etc.) left open by the manufacturers
make the system vulnerable to timing attacks and re-
flashing of external memory [1]. E.g., a weakness in Xbox
360 allows the system to be downgraded to a vulnerable
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Fig. 5: Attack Sequence of Compromising a Smart Home Controller Through an Open Interface
kernel version through a timing attack [73].
Node Cloning. Due to lack of standardization of IoT
device design, mostly the IoT devices such as sensor
nodes and CCTV cameras are developed without any
hardware tamper-proofing. Therefore, these devices can
easily be forged and replicated for unauthorized pur-
poses. This phenomenon is also known as node cloning
[74]. It can happen in any of the two phases, i.e., manu-
facturing phase, as well as during the operational phase.
In the former case, an internal attacker can substitute an
original device with a similar, pre-programmed thing for
unauthorized purposes. Whereas, during the operational
phase, a node can be captured and cloned. Node capture
could further lead to extraction of security parameters and
firmware replacement attacks.
Invasive/Semi-invasive Intrusions. Semi-invasive and
invasive intrusions are a serious threat to smart de-
vices, as trusted boot sequence relies on trusted on-
chip assets. Since long, encryption/decryption keys and
other sensitive information stored on-chip is considered
secure. However, today the invasive methods can reveal
valuable assets stored on the chip and may compromise
any protocol utilizing the secret information. In such an
endeavor [75], the researchers were able to extract the
stored AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) Key from
the internal memory of Actel ProASIC3 FPGA, by launch-
ing “Bumping Attacks”.
Change of Configuration/Firmware-Version. Improper
implementation of encryption and hash functions threaten
the security of the underlying system. E.g., even if a
system is secured with robust authentication mechanism
such as X.509 certificate-based TLS, unless the creden-
tials are securely stored they can be subject to malicious
attacks. Researchers in [76] were able to downgrade
the firmware of Sony Play Station-3, by exploiting weak
cryptographic implementations.
Unauthorized Access to The Devices. Use of default
passwords by the users and hardcoded username and
passwords by the manufacturers is a major security
vulnerability nowadays. For instance, the iBaby M3S
wireless monitor is shipped with a hardcoded username
and a password of “admin”. Whereas, the hardcoded cre-
dentials can only be fixed by a firmware update from the
manufacturer [67]. Moreover, the channels that are left
open by the manufacturers for debugging or OTA (Over
The Air) firmware update, are not always secure. Hence,
developers may leave some open APIs (Application Pro-
gramming Interface) for executing various commands at
a later time. The attackers can exploit these backdoors,
like, the Summer Baby Zoom WiFi camera comes with
hardcoded admin access. The security researchers were
able to exploit this vulnerability to compromise the device
[77].
2) MAC/Adaptation/Network Layer: Numerous
threats affect security at MAC layer, such as unfairness,
interrogation, impersonation and Sybil attacks [78, 79].
Some of the DoS attacks at this level include collision
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TABLE II – Threats to IoT
Ser Threat Vulnerabilities Exploited References
Generalized Threats
1. Eavesdropping and traffic analysis Lack of encryption and network access control [40]
2. Masquerading and unauthorized disclosure
of personal information
Weak data security, authentication and authoriza-
tion mechanism
[41]
3. Device integrity Lack of physical security, no tamper-proofing,
trustless environment,open physical interfaces,
boot process vulnerabilities
[42, 63]
4. Remote code execution Lack of host-based or strong network level security [43]
5. Software/Code integrity No malware detection mechanism, weak network
and application layer security
[9, 8]
6. Threats to communication protocols
(MITM,unauthorized access, DoS
Spoofing the ARP, brute-forcing pre-shared WiFi
key, vulnerability in the exchange of disassociation
message
[45, 47, 53]
7. DoS (Resource exhaustion) attacks Weak network and application layer security [23]
Physical/Perception Layer
1. Eavesdropping Unprotected communication channel, no encryp-
tion
2. Loss of power / Battery drainage Unchecked volume of legal requests, lack of spam
control
3. Hardware failure/exploitation Negligence by the manufacturers, Faults of de-
velopers (hardware and software), Unprotected
interfaces (e.g., UART, JTAG), weak applica-
tion/web,network security
[8, 67]
4. Malicious data injection Weak access control [68]
5. Sybil attack Lack of identity and device management [69]
6. Disclosure of critical information Lack of physical protection for the devices
7. Side channel attacks
8. Device compromise Vulnerable physical interfaces, Boot process vul-
nerabilities
[71, 72]
9. Timing attacks and hardware exploitation Open debugging ports [1, 73]
10. Node cloning Lack of hardware security standardization and
tamper-proofing
[74]
11. Semi-invasive and invasive intrusions Lack of physical security and tamper-proofing [75]
12. Change of configuration/Firmware-version Weak implementation of cryptographic algorithms [75]




1. Unfairness, impersonation and interroga-
tion attacks
Weaknesses in communication protocols (channel
access scheme), MAC spoofing, weak network
access control,
[78, 79]
2. DoS attacks to include collision attack,
channel congestion attack, battery exhaus-
tion attack, exploitation of CSMA, PANId
conflicts




3. Fragmentation attack Lack of security mechanism in 6LoWPAN [24, 82]
4. MITM, eavesdropping Weak authentication and data security [68]
5. Spoofing, hello flood and homing attacks Weak authentication and anti-replay protection [10, 83]
6. Message fabrication/modification/replay at-
tacks
Weak data authentication and anit-replay protec-
tion
[68, 84]
7. Network intrusion and device compromise
(remotely using malware)
Weak network intrusion detection/prevention sys-
tem, weak device access control once the device
is operational,inefficient identity management
[8, 85]
Continued on next page
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TABLE II – Continued from previous page
Ser Threat Vulnerabilities Exploited References
8. Node replication attack and insertion of
rogue devices
Weak network and device access control [78, 86]
9. Selective forwarding attack, Sybil attack,
wormhole attack, blackhole attack
Weaknesses in network routing protocols [10, 87]
10. Storage attacks Centralized data storage, non-replication of data
storage, no protection against malware such as
cryptlocker and ransomware
[8]
11. DoS attacks launched by sending
fake/false messages to a node, server or
a gateway device




1. Malicious codes Lack of application/web security, authentication
and authorization mechanism
[8]
2. Software modification Lack of application/web security [9]
3. Brute force and dictionary attacks, escala-
tion of privileges and data tampering
Weak authentication and authorization mecha-
nism
[89]
4. SQL injection attacks Injection flaws in SQL/noSQL Databases, OS and
LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol)
[90]
5. Identity theft and password/key/session-
token compromise
Incorrect implementation of authentication in ap-
plications vis-a-vis session management
[89]
6. Disclosure of sensitive/private data Insecure web applications and APIs [89]




Identity theft, compromise of user privacy Lack of data/application security [92]
attack, channel congestion attack [10, 80], battery ex-
haustion attack (by increasing the frame counter value
and spoofing of acknowledgement frames) [30, 81], ex-
ploitation of Carrier Sense Multiple Access (CSMA) by
transmitting on multiple channels [30, 80] and initiation
of fake PANId conflicts. At Adaptation layer, there is a
likelihood of a fragmentation attack on 6LoWPAN protocol
[24, 82].
Next, comes the Network Layer, at which most of the
attacks are anticipated because it not only connects
multiple private LANs to each other but also provides an
interface to the internet. Significant threats to security and
integrity of the system include MITM, eavesdropping [68],
spoofing [10], message fabrication/modification/replay at-
tacks [68], unauthorized access to network, compromise
of a device (done remotely using malware) [8], node
replication [78] and insertion of rogue devices [86]. Simi-
larly, the threats to the availability of the network/services
are; hello flood attack, selective forwarding, Sybil attack,
wormhole attack, blackhole attack [10] and storage at-
tacks [8]. DoS Attacks can also be launched by sending
fake/false messages to a node, server [41] or a gateway
device [88].
3) Application Layer: Security is never a preference
for the application developers rather they focus more on
efficiency and service delivery. As a result, the appli-
cations can easily be compromised, and their services
can be denied to the legitimate users. Major threats to
application layer are:
Malicious Code. Malicious codes spreading over the
internet or targeted malware can easily compromise the
connected IoT devices by exploiting their unique vulnera-
bilities, e.g., lack of application security and weaknesses
in authentication and authorization mechanism. The in-
fected devices can be used as bots to launch further
attacks on other end devices/network applications [8].
Software Modification. An attacker can compromise
an IoT device physically or by remote access and then
modify the software or firmware to perform an unautho-
rized action [9]. The exploitation can be done via binary
patching, code substitution or code extension.
Weak Application Security. Security of application/OS
running on an IoT device is of utmost importance. Any
weakness in the authentication and authorization mecha-
nism can result in brute force attack, dictionary attack, un-
wanted disclosure of information, elevation of privileges
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Fig. 6: Attacking a Belkin WeMo Switch by Exploiting an SQL Injection Vulnerability
and data tampering. Moreover, the latest application se-
curity risks ranked by Open Web Application Security
Project (OWASP) [89], pose a valid threat to IoT systems
that rely on websites and applications to provide relevant
services to their users. Some of these application risks
include:
• Injection flaws that threaten SQL/noSQL Databases,
OS and LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Pro-
tocol), pose an equal risk to IoT application and
database servers. In such an endeavor security re-
searchers were able to exploit an SQL injection vul-
nerability in Belkin's smart home products [90]. This
vulnerability allows an attacker to inject malicious
code into the paired Android WeMo smartphone app,
and take root control of the connected home automa-
tion device. As shown in Figure-6, the sequence of
attack is illustrated in 5 steps, i.e., from a to e. In
that, firstly, the attacker discovers an SQL injection
vulnerability in the Belkin WeMo Android app. He
also discovers that there is no authentication and
encryption used for communication with the Belkin
device. Hence, anyone can send a malicious SQLite
file to the device. He does the same and resultantly
gets root level access to the Belkin device. Once
inside, the attacker can launch a DDoS attack or can
cause the IoT devices to malfunction. E.g., The lamp
is kept on for a long time irrespective of the rules
defined by the user. It is imperative to mention here
that once an attacker gains root level access to the
device; he can even kill the firmware update process
initiated remotely by the vendor. Hence, the device
can be kept in the compromised state for as long as
desired by the attacker or until the device is updated
on site.
• Incorrect implementation of authentication in applica-
tions vis-a-vis session management allow attackers
to steal IDs of other users and compromise pass-
words, keys, and session tokens. The inability of a
user to change the default username and password
to access a new device or application is an example
of this weakness. This aspect is critical for IoT
systems based on smart devices, such as smart
city, smart home, smart vehicles and wearable health
monitors. An example of such a vulnerable device
is The Withings Smart Baby Monitor that allows the
users to monitor their babies remotely via a mobile
app. However, the video stream sent from the baby
monitor to the WiFi Router is in plain-text. Hence
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researchers in [25] were able to hijack the session
using ARP poisoning and gain access to the camera
feed.
• Sensitive data exposure due to insecure web appli-
cations and APIs pose a threat to the confidentiality
and privacy of user data collected or processed by
IoT devices such as smartphones, wearable health
monitors and smart watches. An example of such a
vulnerability is the Philips Hue Smart Bulb [25]. It en-
ables the user to control the lighting system through
a mobile app wirelessly. However, the data exchange
via HTTP between the app and the ethernet-enabled
bridge that forwards the commands to the smart
bulb is in plain text. Hence, any MITM attacker or
eavesdropper can sniff the communication between
the user and the smart bulb and ascertain personal
habits of the user. Moreover, attacker can also ex-
tract the list of authorized users from the bridge
and can masquerade as a legitimate user later. The
threat scenario is shown in Figure-7.
• Broken access control is due to lack of restrictions
on authenticated users. Same can be exploited in
an IoT system by attackers to access unauthorized
functionality or data. Such as change of health mon-
itor's thresholds for generating an alarm/notification.
• Security misconfiguration is one of the most com-
mon weaknesses. It implies insecure default config-
urations, open cloud storage, misconfigured HTTP
headers, and overblown error messages that may
contain sensitive information. An IoT device is inse-
cure without secure configuration and timely upgra-
dation of its OS and applications.
• XSS (Cross Site Scripting) is a very prominent threat
to web-based applications, and IoT is not an ex-
ception. Correspondingly, security researchers were
able to exploit a XSS vulnerability in Belkin's smart
home products [90]. Such a vulnerability allows an
attacker to run an arbitrary JavaScript code in the
victim's browser [91]. It can further lead to hacking
into the phone and theft of private data.
4) Semantics Layer: The creation of semantics web
has transformed the web from human-readable form to
machine processable form. The machine processing has
no doubt augmented the human reasoning, interpreting
and decision-making abilities based on automated Big
Data analytics. However, extraction of intelligence or
application specific information from Big Data has its
security and privacy issues. E.g., unauthorized disclo-
sure of personal information stored on social media or
sensitive health-related data may compromise privacy
of a user. Currently, the tools being used to store and
compute big data, such as HDFS (Hadoop Distributed
File System) and Google's MapReduce framework are
considered inadequate to protect sensitive data [92].
E. Security and Privacy Challenges to Cloud-
Supported IoT
The vision of future IoT is a large-scale integration of
various technologies, i.e., sensors, actuators, personal
devices such as smartphones, location services, applica-
tions, servers, etc. The data originating from a multitude
of devices will be available for open sharing across a
range of applications, servers, and users. This public
sharing is currently achieved with the cloud technologies.
Over the period cloud computing [93] has evolved to
process, analyze and store Big Data. Though, cloud
services offer benefits in terms of resource management,
scalability [11, 94], cost effectiveness and shifting of busi-
ness risks including hardware failures to the infrastructure
providers that have better risk management capabilities
[95]. However, mostly the IoT systems are developed for
a particular application in mind. Therefore, the security
aspects are also limited to that particular application with
very less or no consideration for security while data is
in the cloud and being shared openly across a range of
devices. If the legacy IoT systems are connected with the
cloud for extended data sharing, i.e., horizontally between
things or various applications via the cloud, the IoT sub-
systems usually consider and adopt security measures
within their sub-networks. However, once the data leaves
the sub-group and enter the cloud for wide/open shar-
ing, then numerous issues of security and data privacy
emerge. In addition to data confidentiality there are other
issues in cloud computing concerning trust mechanism
between the service provider and cloud infrastructure
provider at various layers of cloud architecture [95].
1) Security of Data: The cloud usually provides se-
cure communication using TLS/DTLS (Datagram Trans-
port Layer Security). TLS provides communication se-
crecy (using symmetric key encryption), server authen-
tication (using Public Key and Domain Controllers) and
message integrity using MAC. Now here a question
arises that what if the data is encrypted by the things
before it is sent to the cloud? This encryption by things
will have following impacts:
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Fig. 7: Threats to Philips Hue Connected Bulb
• The Cloud provider will not have access to legible
data.
• The data cannot be shared publicly.
• The security is to be managed by the things including
complexities of key management, especially, once
the old keys are revoked, and new keys have to be
generated and issued.
• It will affect scalability and restrict data aggregation
and analytics to be performed by the cloud provider.
• Cloud provider is restricted to provide only stor-
age/IaaS (Infrastructure as a Service).
2) Handling of Heterogeneous Data: IoT applica-
tions deal with large amount of widely distributed data
gathered from sub-systems based on multitude devices
like WSN, RFID, smartphones, GPS, etc. Such a diversi-
fied data may exist in different formats hence demanding
appropriate data fusion before the cloud can analyze it.
However, integration and fusion of such a heterogeneous
data may create privacy-related issues [68].
3) User Anonymity Vis-a-Vis ID Management: In
a cloud-supported IoT, drawing a balance between user
anonymity and ID management for authentication, autho-
rization, and audit is a big challenge. E.g., in eHealth
applications, the health-related data of patients is pro-
vided to various organizations for data analytics and de-
velopment of future policies on health issues. Importance
of such a use of patient data for improving health care
cannot be denied. However, it always raises security and
privacy concerns for the patients. Hence, various user
anonymity techniques are being practised to disassociate
the ID of the patients from the health data. But at the
same time, to ensure the security of the cloud-based
health services, user authentication is equally essential
for restricting network access to the legitimate users only.
4) In-Cloud Data Sharing: The vision of future IoT
is extensive sharing of data across a range of devices
and applications, which can only be achieved with a
policy on protection and sharing. Otherwise, if things'
data is stored on the cloud and isolated from other
devices [94], the data processing incorporating multiple
streams may not be possible, and it may also affect
the efficient data analytic services by the cloud provider.
Furthermore, it is estimated that at least one-fifth of
the documents uploaded to file-sharing services contains
sensitive information and 82% of cloud service providers
ensure data security during transmission. However, only
10% encrypt data, once it is stored in the cloud [17].
5) Large-Scale Log Management: In a cloud-
supported IoT, there would be a huge number of hetero-
geneous devices such as sensors, smartphones, smart
controllers, etc. Therefore, logging and audit of the net-
work may be challenging. Few of these challenges may
include: What does the cloud provider must record? If
the log is decentralized then there would be variations
in what is recorded on different systems, and resultantly
there would be different interpretations of the logged
data [96]. Moreover, insufficient logging and monitoring,
coupled with missing or ineffective integration with inci-
dent response, may result in implausible auditing and
accountability thus allowing attackers to launch further
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attacks on the systems. Hence, no doubt most breach
studies show that time to detect a breach is over 200
days which is typically detected by external parties rather
than internal processes or monitoring [89].
6) Vulnerability To DoS Attacks: Cloud providers
usually implement requisite controls to protect against
various cyber-attacks. These checks include vulnerability
mitigation by updating the OS, secure computing using
TPM to protect against malware/code modification at-
tacks, etc. Even if an attack is successful, the isolation
mechanisms contain the effects. However, an IoT Cloud
is vulnerable to a DoS attack launched from compromised
things. Moreover, cloud services are usually designed
to scale up/down resources in response to increasing
demand but are still vulnerable to DoS attacks [97].
7) The Threat of Malicious Things: The cloud be-
ing resourceful and the coordinator between things can
augment the security of cloud-based IoT systems. It
can detect a malicious thing/node during the validation
process. The cloud can also offer a protective security
measure by triggering software/firmware updates where
deemed necessary and resultantly sending control mes-
sages to the things to revoke them from the network
or turn them off. However, there are some challenges
involved in determining/detecting the malicious nodes
in a system [98]. These problems may include: What
method be used to identify or detect a malicious node?
When to initiate the node attestation procedure? If the
attestation is based on software/code verification, then
will it be a challenge-response protocol or a one-way
attestation scheme? Finally, is software-based attestation
scheme effective? or there is a need for a hardware-
based attestation protocol.
F. Security and Privacy Issues in Fog Computing for
IoT
Cloud security is an important factor that has ad-
versely affected the development of cloud computing.
Cloud's centralized data storage and computing frame-
work present a single point of failure and a concentrated
target to the attackers. Hence, to reduce the visibility
of end nodes to the external attackers, fog computing
enables the data to be transiently maintained and an-
alyzed on local fog nodes thereby, also reducing the
processing load, overcoming the bandwidth constraints
and minimizing the latency for time sensitive applica-
tions in IoT [100, 101]. Fog computing does compliment
the cloud by reducing the latency in data provisioning
[102], however, as it is deployed by different fog service
providers that may not be entirely trusted the devices
are vulnerable to be compromised. Fog nodes have
distinctive features, such as decentralized infrastructure,
mobility support, location awareness and low latency
[103], which make them vulnerable to various security
and privacy threats [104, 105]. These threats include
identity and data forgery, eavesdropping, MITM attacks,
DoS attacks, data and device tampering, Sybil attack and
user privacy leakage (identity and location information,
social habits, personal details etc.).
Although all the threats discussed in preceding sections
require due attention. However, the primary objective of
this paper is to get the attention of security researchers
to one of the most realistic and currently practised issue
of code modification and malware attacks. Which, if left
unattended will prove detrimental to the security of future
autonomous IoT systems.
Correspondingly, Bruce Schneier, Chief Technology Offi-
cer (CTO) at IBM Resilient states that IoT devices being
connected to the internet are vulnerable to ransomware
attacks [106]. Recently, in a practical demonstration of
such an attack, white hat hackers have developed a
first of its kind ransomware that compromises a smart
thermostat and then demands a ransom to unlock it [107].
Such a demonstration has shown the possibility of remote
code execution on smart devices that can ultimately
compromise the complete network, e.g., smart home,
smart grid, ICS, smart city. It is, therefore, imperative to
understand the malware attack and its methodology, to
prepare a strong defense.
III. MALWARE THREAT
The history of computer viruses goes back to 1981
when the first “In the Wild” computer virus named Elk
Cloner targeted Apple-II systems [108]. Moreover, since
the commercialization of the internet in the early nineties,
there has been a considerable rise in cyber-attacks
around the world. This number has drastically increased
since the start of the twenty-first century. Same can be
observed in Table-III that shows the trend in different
types of malware over past thirty-seven years [109, 110].
IoT devices being connected to the internet are equally
vulnerable to malware attacks. Hence, it is essential to
analyze the functioning and attack methodology of some
of the significant malware.
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TABLE III:
Trending in Malware Attacks
Malware Type 1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2010 2011-2016 2017 2018
Virus 10 07 03 - - -
Worm 01 02 27 01 - -
RAT + Rootkit - - 21 12 - 1
Botnets - - 2 2 - -
Ransomware 1 - - 16 [99] 2 -
Total 12 9 53 17 2 -
A. Anatomy of Malware
Different types of malware are developed to achieve di-
verse objectives. Some are research-oriented, and some
are released into the wild to attain malicious aims set by
the attackers. The malware roaming in the wild can fur-
ther be categorized as targeted and general threats. Be-
fore we go further, it is imperative to clear the difference
between a threat and an attack. In information security
domain, a threat can be defined as a constant danger
that has the potential to cause harm to an information
system, such as malware, application misconfiguration,
and humans. Whereas, an attack is the successful exe-
cution of a malicious act by exploiting vulnerabilities in an
information system. Therefore, in this section, an attack
methodology of some of the successful malware attacks
is explained. Although a plentiful of malware attacks
such as NotPetya [111], DuQu-2 [112, 113, 114, 115],
Cryptlocker [116], Shamoon-1 [117, 118], Shamoon-2
[119, 120], Flame/SKyWIper [121, 122, 123, 124], Gauss
[123, 125, 126], Icefog [127], Dragonfly-Group/Energetic
Bear [128, 129], Red October [130, 131, 132], and
Night Dragon [121, 133] have been analyzed to derive
the attack methodology (discussed in Section-III.B). A
perceived attack sequence of a cyber-attack based on
a malware is shown in Figure-8. However, detail of some
of the significant malware attacks targeting IoT systems
including ICS, CPS, smart devices, and critical infrastruc-
ture is mentioned here. The attack methodology amply
covers the attack description, vulnerabilities exploited,
attack vectors, propagation mechanism, and effects in-
curred by respective malware.
1) Xafecopy Trojan: A Trojan from Ubsod family (Blue
Screen of Death) was identified in Sep 2017 by Kasper-
sky Labs as Trojan-Clicker-AndroidOS.Xafekopy [134].
Xafecopy trojan mostly disguised as a battery optimizer
app targeted WAP (Wireless Application Protocol) based
Android devices. The malicious app subscribes the victim
user’s MSISDN (Mobile Station International Subscriber
Directory Number) for numerous services on various
websites with WAP billing system that charges directly
to the user’s mobile bill. This trojan is also capable of
bypassing the CAPTCHA (Completely Automated Public
Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart) sys-
tems. A modified version of Xafecopy can also send SMS
from the user's phone to some premium-rate phone num-
bers. They can also delete incoming SMS from the mobile
network provider, and hide notifications about balance
deduction by checking for words like “subscription” in the
incoming messages. It is also capable of switching a user
from WiFi connection to mobile data.
2) WannaCry: A typical ransomware also known as,
Wanna Decryptor, WannaCrypt, WanaCrypt0r and WCry
[135] was detected in May 2017. By then it had affected
230000 systems including health, telecommunications,
transportation, shipping and energy sectors in 150
countries. It propagated over the internet and exploited
Server Message Block (SMB) vulnerability (MS17-010)
in Microsoft Windows 7, 8, 10 and XP systems. It
is assumed that it probably spread through phishing
emails or malicious websites [136]. Once inside the
target system, it would encrypt selected file types before
deleting the original files. The malware also changed the
windows wallpaper and displayed a message bearing
instructions on how to make the payment in Bitcoins
to get the files decrypted. The worm had a killer
switch in itself as it looked for a non-existent domain
(www.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com)
to continue exploitation. However, a security expert found
out this weakness and created the respective domain
thus slowing down the propagation of the malware [137].
Moreover, security researchers in [138], have identified
that the ICS is of primary concern in the backdrop of
malware, especially ransomware attacks. It is because
most of the ICS are always in an operational state,
hence, it is difficult to patch them. Moreover, the ICS
software and protocols rely on NetBIOS and SMB (Server
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Fig. 8: Malware Attack
Message Block) for operation in a distributed computing
environment. Therefore, malware exploiting SMB and
NetBIOS vulnerabilities can cause an adverse effect on
these systems.
3) Cryptlocker: Researchers discovered four million
samples of this ransomware in 2015. Cryptlocker en-
crypted files on the target systesm thus restricting access
of legitimate users to their data. The objective was to get
ransom in return for decrypting the data [116]. The attack-
ers used Angler Exploit Kit to find the vulnerabilities that
were exploited by the malware. The malicious software
is embedded in a pdf document and propagates as an
email attachment through Gameover Zeus Botnet using
encrypted peer-to-peer communication named Kademlia
[139]. It is installed in the user profile folder %APP-
DATA% or %TEMP%. The vulnerable systems and ap-
plications include windows, MAC, Linux, internet explorer
and Adobe Flash. Cryptlocker kept its files encrypted
which made it difficult for ordinary users to identify the
malicious files. Moreover, to avoid forensics, the malware
clears itself from the target computer after putting up
ransom demand. It is estimated that Cryptlocker inferred
a loss of over USD (US Dollars) 1 Billion in 2016. The
gravity of such an attack can be ascertained from an
incident in Austria [140], where an electronic lock system
installed in a hotel was attacked, and guests were locked
out of their rooms. The hotel management had to pay
1500 Euros as a ransom to get the system unlocked by
the attackers.
4) Mirai: An internet based DDoS attack [44] launched
against a computer security journalist Brian Krebs's se-
curity website through IoT Botnets created out of DVR
(Digital Video recorders) and CCTV cameras. The IoT
Botnets directed 620 Gbps traffic towards the website.
The attackers exploited the default username and pass-
words hardwired on the DVRs and CCTV Cameras to
gain access to these devices by launching a dictionary
attack involving sixty-two default usernames and pass-
words for various account types, such as root, admin,
guest, and service. Same malware was also involved in
an attack on a French Cloud Computing Company ”OVH”
[141] and an attack on a DNS provider Dyn in October
2016. The attack on Dyn affected services of some of
the significant technology, eCommerce and web giants in
the world such as Amazon, Airbnb, PayPal, Visa, Twitter,
HBO, CNN, and BBC.
5) Havex: Also known as ”Backdoor: W32” and
”Havex.A”, is an ICS focused Remote Access Trojan
(RAT), created with an objective of spying on the infected
host/server. It targeted websites of three ICS vendors.
It also has the potential to cause a DoS Attack on
OPC (Open Platform Communications) based applica-
tions [142]. Attackers used three attack vectors to entice
the victims to install the software on their systems includ-
ing spam emails, exploit kits and use of watering hole
attacks, i.e., software installers on prominent vendors'
sites were infected with RAT thus any user downloading
the software or an update would automatically download
and install the Trojan. The malware exploited the vulner-
abilities in vendors' websites to Trojanize the software
installer. The Trojanized installer comprised a malicious
file named ”mbcheck.dll”, which was the actual malware.
This file was dropped and executed as the part of a
standard installation. RAT would then communicate with
a Command and Control Server (CCS) and download
numerous plugins for further attacks. Various versions of
RAT plugins had different tasks like enumerating LAN and
listing down connected resources and servers using OPC
[143].
6) Stuxnet: A targeted computer worm designed to
sabotage CPS (Cyber Physical System) installed in
Iranian Nuclear Enrichment Facility was discovered in
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2010. It was delivered through an infected USB flash
drive. Stuxnet exploited four zero-day vulnerabilities in
Windows-based systems to gain an initial foothold. It's
payload was designed primarily for ICS. The malware
consisted of multiple modules including Windows and
PLC rootkits, anti-virus evasion techniques, complexed
process injection and hooking code, network infection
routines, peer-to-peer updates and a CCS interface [144].
Stuxnet specifically targeted PCs running WinCC/PCS-7
control software used for programming the PLCs [145].
It could act as a MITM attacker and mask the mali-
cious code execution by replaying 21 seconds of legit-
imate process input signals. It had the capability of self-
propagation by exploiting print spooler and LNK vulnera-
bility (CVE-2015-0096) in Windows. It comprised rootkits
which could hide its presence and was also equipped
with stolen digital certificates to appear legitimate. The
payload altered the frequency converter drives (from
specific vendors Fararo Paya from Iran and Vacon from
Finland) speed to cause physical damage to over 900
centrifuges [146]. Microsoft released a security update
MS10-061 to fix print spooler and MS-15-018 for windows
shell vulnerability.
B. Attack Methodology
It can be deduced from different characteristics of
malware discussed in the previous section that in the
last decade or so, malware attacks have not only affected
the IT infrastructure but have caused physical damage to
ICS as well. Security researchers in [138], have identified
that the ICS are of primary concern in the backdrop of
malware, especially ransomware threats. It is because
most of the ICS are always in an operational state,
hence, it is difficult to patch them. Moreover, the ICS
software and protocols rely on NetBIOS and SMB (Server
Message Block) for operation in a distributed computing
environment. Therefore, malware exploiting SMB and
NetBIOS vulnerabilities can cause an adverse effect on
these systems. Hence, keeping in view the operating
mechanism and functionalities of the malware, we have
formulated an attack methodology (shown in Figure-9).
It illustrates all possible steps taken by the attackers in
various phases to attack an isolated/public IoT network
remotely.
1) Preparatory Phase: In this phase, attackers carry
out reconnaissance and collect information about the
potential target. The information can be obtained through
social engineering, corporate websites and by using
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various penetration testing toolkits such as Metasploit,
Wireshark, Nmap, Social Engineering Toolkit, Kali Linux,
and Nessus. The penetration testing is done to find the
weaknesses in the target system. The testing can be
performed on networks, websites, and servers. Based on
this information, attackers plan their attack vectors and
develop the malware.
2) Initial Exploitation and Infiltration Phase: After
gaining information about the potential target, the attack-
ers decide on the type of exploit, its functionalities, and
the attack vectors to deliver the exploits to the target
systems. In most of the organizations, not only admin-
istrative staff but even the technical staff is not sound on
information security issues. Therefore, attackers utilize
this weakness and resort to phishing, spear phishing,
watering hole attack and use of infected USB flash drives
to gain an initial foothold in the target systems. There are
some other exploitation methods as well, such as Cross
Site Scripting (XSS), buffer overflow, SQL injection, brute
force and dictionary attacks for password recovery and
use of hacking toolkits.
3) Execution Phase: After intruding into the target
system, the attackers can steal information or perform
a malicious action either by remote access or through
a sophisticated malware that installs a Trojan on the
host system. The malware can be installed by exploiting
zero-day vulnerabilities for which no security update is
available, or by attaining root/admin privileges. Most of
the latest malware versions keep their files in an en-
crypted format to avoid detection by anti-virus or any
other security mechanism. As soon as, the malware
identifies the target system based on the particular file
system, filename keywords, pathname or some other
attributes, the payload is decrypted and executed.
In many cases, the payload installs a RAT, which then
communicates with a CCS and downloads additional
components of the payload or other toolkits/exploits.
Some of the functions a RAT performs include intelli-
gence gathering on network adapters, files and folders,
services in operation, and connected devices. In addition
to espionage, a RAT can enable an attacker to perform
any function on the host system from the escalation
of privileges to physical damage to the hardware. The
RAT is also capable of archiving the stolen data files,
VOIP recordings, key logs and financial information. The
current breed of RATs uses SQL Lite Database, that
archives the data in a compressed format. The stolen
data is usually encrypted before being sent to the CCS.
The data may be delivered directly to the CCS or through
bots to increase complexities for later forensics. Some of
the most notorious RATs currently in use are; Sakula,
Sub7, KjW0rm, Havex (specifically for ICS), ComRAT
(Targets ICS networks), Heseber BOT, Dark Comet, and
Shark.
4) Propagation Phase: The common attribute in both,
”Targeted” and ”In the Wild” malware is the capability
to reproduce or to move from the infected system to
a new host. Because of this functionality, the malicious
software is also termed as self-propagating malware.
These malicious programs exploit security vulnerabilities
at various levels, i.e., application layer, network layer and
web servers to infect systems and then scan the inter-
net/LAN for more vulnerable systems. Such weaknesses
include print spooler, LNK/Windows-shell vulnerability,
network shares and USB memory sticks. The installation
of RAT also facilitates attacker controlled propagation in
the victim network.
5) Hideout and Clean-up Phase: Malware use mul-
tiple techniques to keep themselves invisible, while op-
erating on a victim system. Usually, they keep their
files and folders hidden or keep them encrypted. The
encrypted files are decrypted once the malware reaches
the target system or at the time of execution. Malware,
such as rootkits remain invisible by faking the output of
API calls through hooking techniques. The hooking can
be achieved by intercepting function calls, altering import
tables of executables and use of a wrapper library. Two
most common methods of hooking being implemented
by malware are Import Address Table (IAT) Hooks and
Inline API Hooks. The rootkits also resort to Direct Kernel
Object Manipulation (DKOM) technique that hides its
processes, drivers, files, and intermediate connections
from object manager/task manager. For clandestine op-
eration, these sophisticated malware are also capable
of making hidden registry entries to allow execution of
malicious code at system startup. To remain undetected
from anti-virus, the malicious software are designed to
be metamorphic, i.e., to re-write their code after each
execution. In addition, to avoid forensics and reverse
engineering, these malware can delete their payload and
files at a given time or attacker controlled instances. They
are also capable of removing log data to wipe-off their
footprints.
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Fig. 10: IoT Botnet
Fig. 11: DDoS Attack on IoT
IV. GAP ANALYSIS AND SECURITY FRAMEWORK
An exponential increase in the number of IoT devices
is expected in next four years. However, due to lack
of secure architecture and weak security mechanism
in commercial IoT devices, these will continue to be a
lucrative target for the attackers. Keeping in view the
latest trends in malware-based cyber-attacks, there is a
high probability that IoT devices may be used to create
a botnet army to launch various other attacks such as
DDoS and distribution of ransomware/spyware. Based
on malware attack methodology described in Section-
II, we have deduced an attack methodology of a DDoS
attack on IoT devices, which turns the victim devices
into bots. One of the probable architecture of a botnet
controlled by an attacker is shown in Figure-10. A typical
IoT botnet [147] comprises a CCS that controls the
bots, a Reporting Server that compiles the data about
vulnerable IoT devices and forwards it to the Loader
module. The Loader gains an initial foothold into the
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Fig. 12: IoT Security Against DDoS Attack
victim devices by exploiting the weaknesses such as
hardcoded default login credentials. Once the Loader
logs into the victim device, it instructs the victim device to
contact the Malware Distributor (a server in the botnet) to
download additional malware payload. The infected IoT
devices such as CCTV cameras, DVR, smart meters or
sensing nodes are then used to launch DDoS attacks.
The chronology of this DDoS attack is shown in Figure-
11.
In the preparatory phase, the attacker carries out the
reconnaissance and find out specific vulnerabilities in IoT
devices. The vulnerabilities may include, open hardware
ports (UART, JTAG etc.,), weaknesses in the software/OS
of the device, weak security implementation, i.e., hard-
coded login credentials, weaknesses in the web interface
or APIs, and last but not the least open telnet ports. After
gaining information about IoT device's vulnerabilities, the
attacker plans to get an initial foothold into the vulnerable
devices by selecting/preparing appropriate exploits. In
this case, the exploit can be in the form of malware,
that establishes a telnet connection with the victim device
and logs into the device by using brute-force or dictionary
attack to find out the requisite username and password
out of the list of probable default credentials that could
be used by that specific device manufacturer.
In the execution phase, the infected IoT device down-
loads additional malware payload from the Malware Dis-
tributor. The malware scans the infected IoT device for
other malicious codes, if found, they are deleted, and
victim device is reconfigured to be a part of the IoT
botnet. The IoT bot is then used to launch specific attacks
such as the DDoS attack on targeted websites or servers.
During their lifetime, IoT bots communicate regularly with
the CCS and receive instructions for further attacks. The
infected IoT devices also scan the internet or the internal
network for vulnerable devices and send the scan results
to the Reporting Server. In case of the internet, list of
vulnerable devices can be found using specialized search
engines such as www.shodan.io and www.censys.io. The
Reporting Server forwards the list of vulnerable devices
to the Loader module, which logs into the vulnerable IoT
devices and then instructs them to download additional
malware/payload. Usually, the additional payload is down-
loaded using wget command. The malware can remain
dormant to hide its presence and performs the DDoS
attack only when commanded by the attacker through
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CCS.
Based on the above mentioned DDoS attack, which is
just one of the numerous threats /attacks facing IoT, it is
evident that current IoT security standards and protocols
being implemented by the IoT device manufacturers fail
to protect against modern era's sophisticated malware
attacks. Although existing IoT communication protocols
including CoAP, RPL, 6LoWPAN and 802.15.4 do pro-
vide communication security at various layers of the
IoT protocol stack (shown in Table-IV). However, the
communication protocols alone, cannot protect against
malware/code-modification attacks [24, 30]. Hence, this
paper proposes a security mechanism (shown in Figure-
12) against IoT botnet malware, comprising preventive,
detective, responsive and corrective measures. In ad-
dition to the security measures, the proposed security
model also illustrates the impact on an attacker's method-
ology of attack based on various phases, as shown in
Figure-10. However, in a realistic world keeping in view
the plethora of IoT devices' vulnerabilities and related
threats as discussed in Section-II, the proposed secu-
rity mechanism as shown in Figure-12 is insufficient.
Therefore, security of IoT ecosystem requires to be dy-
namic, innovative and wholesome so that it is always
one step ahead of the adversaries. A comprehensive
security mechanism means proactive approach towards
the security of devices, data, applications, networks, and
users. Hence, there is a need for concise and practical
guidelines for the development of a dynamic IoT security
framework that can detect contemporary threats, predict
future security events and respond swiftly to mitigate the
risks and take remedial actions.
A. Guidelines for IoT Security Framework
To prepare a composite set of guidelines for edifying
IoT security, we have reviewed the best practices cur-
rently being deployed by some of the technical giants of
the world such as IBM (IBM Watson IoT), Cisco, AT&T
(American Telephone & Telegraph), and TCG (Trusted
Computing Group). A graphical illustration of these guide-
lines is shown in Figure-13 and Figure-14. Table-V also
glances over the security measures and their respective
impact/protection against threats. These security mea-
sures are discussed in details in the succeeding sec-
tions.
1) Risk Assessment and Threat Modelling: The
first step in the development of a security policy for
any organization is carrying out the risk assessment for
all processes, equipment (hardware & software both),
stakeholders and information assets at each layer of
IoT architecture. E.g., starting from the manufacturing,
transportation, installation and commissioning stage to
the operation and management of the IoT system. The
primary objective of this assessment is to identify what
all security incidents can happen in the organization,
and subsequently initiating the risk treatment process
to minimize the damage of such events. Almost all the
information security standards enforce risk management
as an integral part of the overall controls.
ISO-27001 [150], an international standard for Informa-
tion Security Management System (ISMS) outlines seven
steps to an effective risk assessment. The first step is
about How the organization is going to define its risk
methodology? The methodology includes risk ownership,
means of measuring the impact of risk on confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of information and the method of
calculating the effects of the identified risks. The second
step involves determining all possible information assets,
failure of which can cause some loss to the organization.
The third step focuses on identification of threats and the
potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited. In the fourth
step, organizations are required to map risk impacts
against the likelihood of their occurrences. The fifth step
is the most important, as it involves the implementation
of measures to avoid, mitigate, transfer or accept the
risks. Sixth and seventh step includes preparation of risk
treatment plan and continuous monitoring of the ISMS
for any dynamic changes to the overall security plan.
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
have also issued a special publication 800-30 [151] as
a guide to conduct a risk assessment for the security of
information systems. Any such standard can be followed
until there are some IoT specific standards on board.
2) Defense-in-Depth: Due to increase in sophistica-
tion and complexity of cyber-attacks, no IT infrastructure
can be termed ”Safe”. No security measure claims to
prevent 100% attacks. Therefore, the ”Defense-in-Depth”
mechanism requires substantial preventive, detective, re-
sponsive and corrective actions. However, at the same
time, implementation and practice of security measures
should not be so complicated that users avoid and go
around them. Hence, a comprehensive defense mech-
anism should be planned based upon risk profiles of
the information assets of the organization. Cisco has
issued a straightforward and handy defense in depth
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TABLE IV:
Security Provided by IoT Communication Protocols
IoT Layer Protocol Security Measures
Physical 802.15.4 Nil [24]
MAC 802.15.4
Data Confidentiality, Data
Authenticity & Integrity, Replay
Protection, Access Control
Mechanism [24]







Authenticity & Integrity, Replay
Protection, Semantic Security, Key
Management [148]
Application CoAP (ConstrainedApplication Protocol)
Data Confidentiality, Data
Authenticity & Integrity, Replay
Protection, Non Repudiation [149]
strategy checklist [152] that can help in evaluating the
overall security framework of an organization. Moreover,
the defense in depth approach requires the organizations
to take all possible preventive, detective, reactive and
corrective measures. All of these steps are discussed in
detail in subsequent sections.
3) Preventive Measures:
Security by Design. The architects of the IoT systems
should consider the non-zero likelihood of device com-
promises while developing security protocols. Therefore,
security should be enabled by design and users should
have the leverage to change the security settings as per
their requirements [17, 153]. In addition, due considera-
tion should be given to the following points:
• The trusted environment for secure computing.
• Security of all open/debugging ports.
• The integrity of firmware/code.
• Access control based on multi-factor authentication.
Device Security. Allocation of a unique device iden-
tifier to each IoT device and its continuous validation
is essential to ensure platform integrity and controlled
access to system resources [154]. The devices should
prove their unique ID to set up secure communication
with their respective neighbors. The neighbor can be a
node, a gateway device or an application server. The
security of device ID against spoofing attacks is critical
for sensitive organizations. Moreover, currently, device ID
is required for most of the network security protocols
such as IPSec, TLS, and SSH. Similarly, there should be
some mechanism for safe storage of keys, passwords,
certificates and other security critical information on the
device, that cannot be tampered by the adversary [43].
To solve the problem of secure device ID, TCG pro-
poses the use of TPM-based keys as device IDs, which
complies with IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan
Area Networks and Secure Device Identity (802.1AR)
[155, 156]. The TPM provides enhanced security for de-
vice identifiers by protecting these keys in the hardware.
Therefore, these keys are protected against unautho-
rized disclosure during malware and hardware tampering
attacks. Another advantage of this technology is that
being based on TPM, the cryptographic ID is bounded
to the particular device [156], which makes it almost
impossible for an attacker to spoof that particular ID using
different hardware. However, it is a general opinion that
use of cryptographic identifiers results in privacy issues.
Therefore, to avoid long-term user keys/IDs that may
lead to unwanted tracking, TCG proposes the use of
TPM-based attestation identity keys or direct anonymous
attestation.
There is also a requirement of device registration so
that devices can be added or removed as and when
required and only authorized devices are included in
the network. The device registration may encompass
maximum information about the device such as device ID,
its role/capabilities, type, level of security/authorization
as per sensitivity of data, public key, software/firmware
version and authorized period of activation. One of the
possibilities to ensure a transparent and immutable de-
vice registry is the use of Blockchain technology [43].
IoT devices often operate in an untrusted environment
without any physical protection such as traffic light sen-
sors, environmental sensors, agriculture sensors, smart
city sensors and a lot more. Therefore, the end devices
in an IoT system should be environmentally rugged and
tamper proof to protect against any malicious forging
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and access to device hardware. However, in case an
adversary tries to tamper the device hardware physi-
cally, it should fail safely [157]. Such that upon detection
of any tampering attempt, the device memory should
automatically wipe off all the data it is storing. This
may protect against illegal access to sensitive corporate
data, cryptographic primitives (passwords, keys, unique
identifiers of neighboring nodes etc.) or any intellectual
property. Some of the embedded systems manufacturers
implement end-to-end security in their devices, such as
ARM mbed [158] provides secure boot and built-in cryp-
tographic and protocol support to ensure secure network
connection. Whereas, Juniper Networks [159] make use
of Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA)/Extended
Verification Module (EVM) to detect any accidental and
malicious file modifications. The files are attested before
they are accessed. The attestation can be done locally
or via remote attestation. NXP is yet another manufac-
turer and developer of various solutions for embedded
systems [160]. It offers a secure authentication and anti-
counterfeiting technology in the form of tamper-resistant
CPU and a secure memory that can store cryptographic
keys and a device identifier.
Given dynamic threat spectrum, the firmware of IoT
devices also continuously evolve by installing periodic
security and other operational updates. Therefore, it is
imperative that all the IoT users especially the critical in-
frastructure owners such as smart grid, ICS, traffic control
systems, nuclear power plants, air travel and railway sys-
tems, keep the software/firmware of their devices up to
date to protect against any security vulnerability identified
by the device manufacturers. Another important aspect
of any distributed IoT system based on heterogeneous
devices is authenticated and secure broadcast of security
updates and control messages.
Change of default device configuration especially the se-
curity settings such as username and passwords should
be implemented immediately upon the first installation of
the IoT devices. In today's hostile environment security
should not be an optional feature instead it should be
implemented by design [157]. Hence, the device firmware
should prompt the user for a change of default security
settings before it starts functioning.
Data Security. Security of data mostly refers to the triad
of information security, i.e., confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of data. To ensure security of data, organiza-
tions must classify their data as per its sensitivity and then
grant access to users according to their authorization to
access respective class of data [17]. Moreover, in the
current era of IoT, the privacy of data must not be ignored
such that personal information should not be disclosed
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publicly or to an entity not authorized to view. In the age
of data-driven business development policies, security of
PII (Personally Identifiable Information) in medical and
financial records require due consideration. IoT business
owners or cloud service providers should continuously
weigh the utility of user data they are maintaining against
the risk of holding it. Whenever the said ratio gets out of
proportion, i.e., the risk of keeping large privacy-sensitive
user data is more than its further utility; the companies
should delete old data. Authors in [157] state that in
case of corporate sector data theft, the unauthorized
disclosure of intellectual property may create conflicts in
ownership of such data. To ensure the security of private
data, researchers in [15] suggest the use of ephemeral
and separate identifiers during communications and while
in storage.
In a cloud environment, there should be a secure device-
to-cloud interaction. In a similar effort, IBM Watson IoT
uses TLS v1.2 for authenticated and encrypted IoT de-
vice interactions, which ensure secure exchange of data
over the network. The data sent from the end device to
the cloud must be encrypted to preserve the confiden-
tiality of user information [17]. However, the encryption
of user data restricts intra-cloud processing and data
analytics. To overcome such an issue, use of homo-
morphic encryption is recommended [161]. Authors in
[17] also suggest the use of a Cloud Access Security
Broker (CASB) that not only helps in maintaining a secure
link between corporate network and the cloud services
provider but also gives organizations insight into cloud
applications and services being used by its employees.
Irrespective of the type of storage, data availability to
authorized users is a critical requirement for any orga-
nization. Moreover, in the wake of a recent surge in ran-
somware attacks, security of relevant personal/corporate
data is equally vital. It is recommended that a dis-
tributed storage mechanism should be preferred over
a centralized storage to avoid a single point of failure.
Blockchain provides a secure, unforgeable and a trans-
parent mechanism for distributed storage, in which every
transaction is validated by network consensus [162]. IBM
Blockchain [163], Microsoft Azure [164] and Hyperledger
Fabric by Linux Foundation [165] are few examples of
multi-purpose Blockchain platforms.
Authentication and Access Control. Authentication for
controlled access to an IoT system is not limited to
devices only. Same applies to applications and gateway
devices as well [17, 154]. It is required to protect sen-
sitive information against malicious applications down-
loaded by the users from unauthorized sources. Simi-
larly, gateway devices are to be authenticated to protect
against the introduction of a forged gateway device in the
network. Depending upon desired security level, multi-
factor authentication may be used, i.e., a combination of
password/passkey and a biometric identifier. Moreover,
mutual authentication between IoT devices and IoT ser-
vices/devices can prevent against masquerading of IoT
services by malicious parties. In addition, it can further
help in accountability and forensic analysis.
Considering the importance of network access control,
authors in [166] proposed a traffic flow based network
access control. It implements the access control based
on numerous traffic flow identifiers, such as MAC ad-
dress, source and destination address (IP address). Sim-
ilarly, IBM Watson IoT uses IBM Bluemix that imple-
ments role-based controls for users, applications, and
gateways to realize security of data and access to
other services/resources [86]. Such a distinction between
roles helps in the implementation of unified security
policies across the complete network. In addition to role,
geographical location [167], department, device type,
OS/firmware version and the time of the day at which
user seeks access [17] can also form the basis of access
control policies.
Correspondingly, authors in [168] propose an identity-
based cryptographic authentication scheme without the
need of a Key-escrow mechanism to secure M2M in-
teractions in CPS. The scheme saves upon precious
computation and communication resources by averting
the process of signature generation, transmission and
verification. The proposed scheme is also claimed to
be robust against MITM, impersonation, replay, DoS
and node compromise attacks. In a similar endeavor,
security researchers in [169] have designed a novel
mutual authentication and key establishment scheme to
secure M2M communication in 6LoWPAN networks. The
proposed scheme duly cater for the static as well as
the mobile nodes in a 6LoWPAN network. Respectively,
[170] suggests a certificate-less anonymous authenti-
cation scheme based on hybrid encryption to secure
multi-domain M2M communication in CPS. The proposed
solution is considered to be tolerant against MITM, replay,
impersonation, DoS, and node compromise attacks.
Controlled access to user data by third parties is an
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important issue. Currently, user data owned by most of
the online services is made available to the third parties in
the form of APIs. The possibility of an unauthorized entity
besides the generator of the information and the host ser-
vice accessing the user information cannot be ruled out.
Such an event can result in various privacy and ethical
problems. Hence, authors in [171] propose an OAuth-
based external authorization service for IoT scenarios.
Instead of smart objects/devices storing the authoriza-
tion related information and performing the computation
intensive verification process, the verification of a request
by a service is delegated to an external OAuth-based
authorization service. Such an arrangement provides
flexibility to the service provider (hosting user data) to
remotely configure the access control policies. However,
the delegation of authorization logic to an external service
demands strong trust between the service provider/smart
object and IoT-OAS (OAuthorization-based Authorization
Service). There is also a requirement of a secure com-
munication link between the service provider/smart object
and IoT-OAS. Moreover, if the smart object directly offers
its data as a service, then there is a likelihood of a DoS
attack if the smart object receives a large number of
simultaneous requests. The proposed scheme is also vul-
nerable to a MITM attack if the attacker uses an untrusted
HTTP/CoAP proxy. In this way, an attacker can have
access to the communication between endpoints and can
also get hold of the authorization information. Based on
the apprehended authorization information attacker can
spoof the service requester's ID. The scheme also does
not protect against a physical compromise of the device.
In another work, to facilitate and securely manage remote
access by users to corporate networks/sites, [17] recom-
mends software-defined perimeter to restrict access to
legitimate users. In addition to mere user authentication,
such a security perimeter ensures that the user accesses
the applications, services and data as per his authoriza-
tion only.
Software Integrity. It is to be made sure that only le-
gitimate software is running on IoT devices, during initial
bootup, at runtime and during firmware updates. Software
integrity is one of the important pillars in IoT security
as cryptographic algorithms, network security protocols,
secure storage and other such tasks are implemented by
software [43].
Mobile Applications. It is being covered as a separate
entity because downloading of mobile applications from
unauthorized stores is one of the primary sources of
corporate networks infection. The organizations are ad-
vised to enable installation of only whitelisted apps on
corporate devices and should provide a list of the same
to its employees for implementation on their personal
devices as well [17].
Security of Non-Corporate Smart Devices. Increase
in use of smartphones, wearable smart devices such as
fitness trackers/bands, smart watches and smart home
appliances including smart thermostat, intelligent lighting
system, smart TV, smart cooling system, smart doors,
etc., has added another dimension to IoT ecosystem. It is
a common belief that mobile phones, wearable or smart
home devices do not contain sensitive information, so
they do not require security [17]. Resultantly, manufactur-
ers do not pay much heed towards security of these de-
vices [11]. Due to this lack of security consciousness, IoT
devices have recently been subjected to massive DDoS
attacks [44]. It is also viewed that in future, nation states
can sponsor the sale of apparently legitimate IoT devices
for cyber espionage [17] or sabotage of target systems.
Therefore, it is recommended that a minimum security
standard should be set for mobile/wearable smart devices
with an emphasis on following: Access to device based
on at least two factor authentication, i.e., password and a
biometric identifier, limited access to corporate data (only
viewing option without any modification rights), storage of
sensitive data such as health and financial information in
encrypted form.
The corporate networks should provide remote access
to those devices only that meet the minimum security
requirements. It is also recommended that enterprises
should enable mobile access to their systems through
VPNs based on multi-factor authentication.
Key Management. Secure key management is the base-
line for the security of any IoT system. It includes key gen-
eration, key distribution, key storage, key revocation and
key updates. TCG provides a hardware-based secure
key management system that supports various options
for provisioning of keys during IoT device lifecycle, i.e.,
during chip manufacturing, assembly of the device, while
enrolling with a management service and during owner-
personalization. It also provides secure key update over
an untrusted network [156].
Network Segmentation. Network segmentation or seg-
regation is an effective methodology to curtail the impact
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of a node or a part of network compromised by an
adversary. It not only protects networks and systems
of different security classifications but also protects sys-
tems of the same classification with varying security
requirements. Depending on the system architecture and
configuration, network segmentation can be achieved by
various methods. Some of these include implementation
of demilitarized zones, physical isolation, use of VLANs,
software-defined perimeter, application firewalls, applica-
tion and service proxies, user and service authentication
and authorisation, and last but not the least content-
based filtering [172].
Virtualized Security. The shift from hardware to Soft-
ware Defined Networks (SDN) has revitalized the flex-
ibility in the implementation of effective security mea-
sures. Virtualized security has enabled protection of data
irrespective of its location. Another benefit of this virtu-
alization is that instead of maintaining dedicated hard-
ware for numerous security protocols such as encryption,
secure routing, and secure gateways, software-based
security solutions can be implemented on a single shared
platform. Such a dynamic security solution will enable
organizations to enforce security policies with persistence
in every type of IoT system, i.e., private or cloud-based
IoT architecture.
An example of SDN-based security enhancement for IoT
systems has been demonstrated in [25]. The researchers
believe that SDN can be used to augment IoT device-
level protections by implementing dynamic security rules
at the network level. To achieve this goal, researchers in
[25] have proposed a software-based Security Manage-
ment Provider (SMP) that provides appropriate access
control functionality to the users of IoT systems such
as smart lighting, smoke alarm and baby monitor, to
preserve their privacy and further improve the security.
SMP exercises dynamic configuration control over ISP
network and the home router on behalf of the user. It
communicates with the ISP network via APIs and also
interacts with the IoT system users via GUIs. The pro-
posed security solution thus motivates the manufacturers
to concentrate less on UI (User Interface) development
and instead focus on the development of APIs that allow a
third-party, i.e., SMP to configure IoT behaviour at various
layers of IoT architecture.
In yet another work, [173] proposes an SDN-based secu-
rity architecture for heterogeneous IoT devices in an Ad-
Hoc network. The proposed architecture comprises smart
nodes, OpenFlow enabled nodes, OpenFlow enabled
switches and distributed SDN controllers. The multiple
SDN controllers are synchronized to provide a granular
network access control and network monitoring. Hence,
all network devices are first authenticated by the con-
trollers, before they start accessing network services as
per their authorization.
Conclusively, it is the SDN controller that monitors and
manages all aspects of the network including security,
and the interface between SDN applications and the
hardware components [174]. Hence, SDN controller, be-
ing a focal point of all the control activities can be termed
as a lucrative target for the malicious attacks. Thereby, a
successful attacker may gain unauthorized access to the
controller and insert viruses or malware in the network
thus threatening the confidentiality, integrity and the avail-
ability of data and other network services [57]. Similarly,
authors in [174] also identify various threats to SDN such
as unauthorized access, data leakage, data modifica-
tion and misconfiguration. The authors also highlight the
eavesdropping and jamming threats on the physical layer
of Software Defined Optical Networks (SDON). However,
they also underline a security measure to protect against
eavesdropping and jamming in optical lightpath based
on a hopping mechanism. But such a mechanism also
suffers some shortcomings concerning secure exchange
of hopping sequence between the transmitter and the
receiver and protection against MITM attacks. It is, there-
fore, imperative to protect SDN against such single point
of failures and attacks on centralized controllers.
Adaptive Security Management. Most of the IoT ap-
plications such as eHealth monitoring comprising BSN
with dynamic network topology, require adaptive security
management. Authors in [41] propose a metrics-driven
adaptive security management model for eHealth IoT
applications. The proposed security model monitors and
collects the security contextual information from within
the system as well as from the environment. Based on
collected data, it measures the security level and matrics,
analyzes the received data and responds by changing
the security parameters such as encryption scheme,
authorization level, authentication protocol, level of QoS
available to various applications and reconfiguration of
the protection mechanism.
Security of Automated M-2-M Communication. In an
IoT ecosystem, M-2-M communication is an important





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE V – Security Measures and Their Impact
Ser
Security Measure Impact / Threat Protected Against References
1. Risk assessment and threat modelling
Identification of all possible threats,
vulnerabilities and risks. Helps in the
development of a risk mitigation plan and








Security by design from the vendors
(Change of default security settings on
device startup, security of all debug
ports/interfaces)
Users' unawareness, unauthorized access
to the devices through backdoors,
firmware and software modification
AT&T [17], IBM [153]
3. Device identity (ID) management
ID spoofing and device replication attacks.




4. Tamper-proofing of IoT devices
Unauthorized disclosure of cryptographic
keys and passwords, modification of
code/firmware and replication/cloning of
devices
IBM [154], NXP [160]
5.
IoT device registration and
management




Secure boot and builtin cryptographic
protocols support
Unauthorized access to device and




Use of Integrity Measurement
Architecture (IMA) or Extended
Verification Module (EVM)





Data classification and requisite user
authorization




Use of ephemeral identifiers for
communication and storage of data
User privacy in the context of PII IBM [15]
10.
Identity-based authenticated
encryption and mutual authentication
schemes for CPS,
Impersonation, MITM, eavesdropping,




Privacy issues in cloud-based IoT during
data processing/analytics
[161]
12. Cloud Access Security Broker (CASB)




Data integrity issues including data
modification and forgery, replay attacks,
malware attacks targeting data security,
integrity and availability such as










Authentication and access control in
applications (including white/black
listing)
Downloading of malicious applications IBM [154]
15.
Endpoint and gateway device
authentication and access control
Introduction of forged end/gateway




Authentication between devices within
an IoT system
Masquerading of IoT services by
malicious parties. It also facilitates
accountability and forensic analysis
Continued on next page
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TABLE V – Continued from the previous page
Ser
Security Measure Impact / Threat Protected Against References
17.
Role-based access control for the
users of an IoT system (In addition to
role, access control policy can also
consider geo location, department,
device type, OS/firmware version and
time of the day)
Security and privacy issues related to
data and unauthorized access to the
network services
IBM [86], Cisco [167]
18.
Ensure software integrity during initial
boot up, at runtime and during
firmware/software updates




Security of data in personal IoT
devices (Smart watch, smartphone,






Secure remote access to corporate
networks from smart IoT end-devices
using VPN and limiting access to
end-devices meeting minimum
security standards
Attacks on corporate networks, security




Key management (including key
generation / distribution / storage /
revocation / updates





isolation, VLANs, software defined
perimeter, application firewalls/proxies
and content-based filtering)




23. Virtualized security based on SDN
Augment IoT device-level protection by
implementing security at the network level.
Hence, reducing burden of cost related to
the development of security protocols for
low-cost IoT devices for the manufacturers
[25, 173]
24.
Use of self-encrypting devices/drives
(SED)
Unauthorized disclosure of data TCG [155, 175]
25. Adaptive security management




Execution of signed binaries,
TPM-based secure software updates,
static code analysis, runtime stack
analysis
Malware attacks TCG [155]
27.




Security awareness workshops and





29. Runtime verification of firmware/code Malicious code, corrupt software
30. Log management Facilitates detection of security breaches
31. Network security analytics





32. Edge security analytics
Facilitates isolation of security events at
the source and limit attack spectrum
IBM [43]
Continued on next page
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TABLE V – Continued from the previous page
Ser
Security Measure Impact / Threat Protected Against References
33.
Network level security measures to
enforce cross-device security policies




Penetration testing and vulnerability
assessment
Detect/identify weaknesses in all layers of
IoT protocol architecture to facilitate
respective countermeasures
Responsive Measures
35. Incident response plan
To streamline the response in case of a
security incident and facilitate in




Self-recovery and diagnostics, and
remote attestation
To recover from the security incident by
reconfiguring the devices and removing all
remnants of the attack
TCG [155]
37. Secure reboot of RT-IoT devices
To recover from malware that resides in
the RAM
[176]
automation such as power plants, intelligent traffic control
system, railways, smart grids, and smart cities. This
type of communication ranges from information sharing
between robotic/intelligent controllers and smart actu-
ators/appliances to data sharing between smart vehi-
cles. The automated exchange of information between
unknown entities must meet the security and privacy
requirements. Taking the example of IoV (Internet of
Vehicles), it is recommended that any proposed solution
should meet specific security requirements such as data
authentication, data integrity, data confidentiality, access
control based on authorization, non-repudiation, avail-
ability of the best possible communication link and anti-
jamming measures [180].
Protection Against Malware Attacks. There is an in-
creasing trend in ransomware attacks over the last four
years in which the number of attacks has risen to 638
Million in 2016 from 3.8 Million in 2015 [181] and are
still being counted in 2017-18. As per Symantec Corpo-
ration [182], ransomware attacks increased by 4500% in
2014, being too profitable for cybercriminals. Symantec
Corporation has proposed few dos and don'ts for the
consumers and businesses to protect themselves from
such attacks. The preventive measures include: Do not
pay the ransom, avoid clicking attachments in unknown
emails, keep software up to date, must use security
applications and finally the most important step is to take
periodical backup of valuable data.
Some common security measures against most of the
malware attacks include, not to use hardwired/default
username and passwords. In addition, use only authen-
ticated and encrypted protocols for inbound connections,
i.e., SSH (Secure Shell) for telnet, SFTP (Secure File
Transfer Protocol) for FTP (File Transfer Protocol) and
https for http. Finally, keep all external interfaces of the
administrative connections closed. Security at lower lay-
ers should be complemented by application level access
control, use of multi-factor authentication protocols, use
of OPC tunnelling technologies, installation of update
patches, deployment of software restriction policy (appli-
cation white-listing), white-listing of legitimate executable
directories, use of IPSec or VPN for remote access [142],
implementation of ingress and egress filtering, restricted
number of entry points to ICS Network, maintenance of
logs and use of configuration management tools to detect
changes on field devices.
Similarly, numerous security solutions proposed by TCG
technologies [155] help to prevent unauthorized access
to security-critical programs and data. To solve this issue
Self Encrypting Drives (SED) based on TCG specifica-
tions are in common use for embedded systems such
as ATMs, secure mobile phones, corporate copiers, and
printers. In these drives, encryption is implemented in
the hardware, and data is automatically encrypted in a
transparent way to the user. The drives can be safely
sanitized for reuse without any need for rewriting multiple
layers of garbage data. The user is just required to delete
the cryptographic key. As a result, the data stored is made
illegible. The hardware-based automatic encryption is
termed efficient and secure than simple software-based
encryption, which can be turned off anytime by the user
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[175].
In addition to restricting unauthorized disclosure to sen-
sitive data, the malware should be prevented from exe-
cution from the beginning. The two best techniques for
this purpose are whitelisting and execution of manufactur-
ers' signed binaries only. TCG offers TPM-based secure
software updates, static code analysis, data execution
prevention and runtime stack analysis. Any combination
of such techniques can ensure the integrity of a runtime
environment [155]. Although hardware-based security
protections are always efficient and more secure than
software-based solutions, however keeping in view the
cost effect and hardware complexity, these techniques
may not be feasible for resource-constrained embedded
devices such as wireless sensors and actuators. In such
cases, the best way is to program the device to reboot
periodically and make use of boot time protections. How-
ever, rebooting a sensor or actuator periodically may de-
grade the performance of resource-constrained devices.
Such devices are usually battery operated and have
limited energy. Hence, frequent restarts may drain the de-
vice's resources. Another, limitation of restart-based re-
covery mechanism is that it can destabilize RT-IoT (Real-
time IoT) systems that need consistent actuation with
tight timing constraints. To address this issue, authors in
[176] propose a runtime restart-based security protocol
“ReSecure” for RTS (Real-time Systems). ReSecure is a
blend of hardware and software mechanisms that enable
a tradeoff between the security guarantees and control
performance while ensuring the safety of the physical
system at all times.
Human Factor. Any level of security is not sufficient until
the users of the respective organization are security con-
cious and believe in the reality of the threats. Any unin-
tended action like connecting an infected USB flash drive
to a company's private network can cause a disaster for
that enterprise. The organizations should deploy network-
wide security policies to implement controls based on
authentication, authorization, role and even incorporating
geolocation of the users. Enterprises should organize
periodic security updates and awareness lectures for its
employees covering following dimensions:
• Current threat environment.
• Attack vectors being used by hackers/adversaries.
• Implications of sharing sensitive corporate and per-
sonal information on public/rogue networks.
• Downloading and installation of applica-
tions/software from unauthorized sources.
• Storing of corporate data in personal laptops/flash
storage devices that too without encryption.
• Use of private email accounts for official purpose.
• Throwing of important official documents in open
bins, thus giving an invitation to the attackers for
dumpster diving.
• Use of default settings for smart devices.
• Sharing of sensitive data over social media that too
with default (lowest) security settings.
• Avoid malicious links in unknown emails.
4) Detective Measures:
Firmware/Code Attestation. Runtime verification of
firmware/code installed on an IoT device is an impor-
tant means of detecting execution of a malicious code
installed remotely on a device.
Auditing (Log management). A record of all changes
made to the system and devices be maintained to enable
periodic audits to detect security breaches.
Hardened Gateway Devices. Security hardened gate-
way devices can be used to monitor sensors data feed
to determine the health of communication b/w devices
and services-based applications.
Security Analytics. It helps in gaining visibility of the
IoT ecosystem and ultimately controlling all the net-
work components including the hardware and software
to detect and rectify any malfunction or a threat [167].
IBM uses a Cognitive IoT (CIoT) Security Framework
named Security-360. All the network components includ-
ing devices, users, applications, business processes and
even workload contribute to form a 360-degree view of
the security posture. Based on data provided by the
entire environment, the security mechanism assesses
the changes in the security posture of the network and
plans a defense. In this regard, various data mining
and machine learning techniques can provide automated
methods to track normal behaviour and flag anoma-
lies [177, 178, 179]. Moreover, Security Information and
Event Management (SIEM) is also considered a vital
component of a defense-in-depth approach to network
security. It is therefore concluded that intelligent threat
analytics should be able to protect the IoT ecosystem
against all sort of threats based on known signatures,
predictable malicious behavior [17] and correlation of
security incidents/events.
A subset of overall system security analytics is “Edge Se-
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curity Analytics”. It is implemented by deploying security
intelligence gateways. These intelligent devices provide
swift responses to security incidents by faster detection
of anomalies and re-mediation by isolation of events at
the source and limiting attack spectrum. They also help
in preserving the privacy of sensitive data by carrying out
processing locally [43].
Redefining Network Level Security for IoT. Today, IoT
device manufacturers just focus on novel functionality,
easy operation and earliest product launch in the market.
Hence, they do not give attention to device security. This
lack of manufacturers' attention to security coupled with
constraint resources, IoT devices are not suitable for
traditional host-based protections (anti-virus and security
patches). Hence, researchers in [38] proposed a network
level security architecture to secure IoT devices. Their
security architecture employs an IoTSec (security con-
troller), µmboxes (gateways for IoT devices) and IoT end
nodes.
The IoTSec controller centrally monitors the network to
record security contexts and environmental variables for
each end device, to form a global view of a set of possible
states of the system. Based on the set of states IoTSec
decides or controls the flow of commands to the end
devices. The proposed system is claimed to be equally
useful to enforce cross-device security policies. E.g., in
a smart home, if an attacker hacks into a fireplace and
commands it to ignite the fire in order to cause an
accident. To address this vulnerability, the IoTSec con-
troller ensures that the fireplace is turned on only if the
camera detects that someone is present in that room. The
status of camera output, i.e., the presence of a person
in the room can be read from the current global state
of the smart home maintained by the IoTSec controller
itself. However, certain issues related to centralization
of IoTSec controller and the limitation of using different
µmboxes for every other kind of IoT device needs to be
addressed.
5) Responsive Measures: An effective incident re-
sponse plan begins even before any security incident oc-
curs. In an IT environment, the response team is usually
called as Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT).
These teams comprise skilled cybersecurity profession-
als, auditors, legal experts, IT administrators and other
specialized members. The goal of CERT is to develop
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and physically practice a comprehensive response plan
against any security breach so that all the stakeholders
are clear about their responsibilities. An organized and
well-planned incident response can make or break any
business. The response measures are also termed as
after-incident reactive measures, which include:
• Action against compromised devices/parts of the
system allowing rest of the system to run its routine
functionality.
• Revocation and blacklisting of malicious nodes.
• Initiation of anti-tamper mechanism, in which, as
soon as the hardware of the node is interfered
with, the node's memory containing firmware and the
code should immediately be wiped off, and the node
should only join the network after being activated
by personalization instead of OTAA (Over The Air
Activation).
• Disconnect connectivity from the internet.
• Isolation of compromised sub-systems so that
healthy part of the network remains available.
• Recover important official and personal data from
backup.
6) Corrective Measures: Once an IoT device is
compromised, detected and isolated from the network,
the next step is node recovery, i.e., secure firmware/code
update and reactivation of the device. There are two
methods of node recovery. The first one is self-recovery,
in which, the device itself performs the integrity check
of the code running on it and the last best configuration
stored in read-only storage. If the validation fails, the
device deletes the current code and reinstalls last best
configuration. The device then restarts and performs
validation of all its modules. The second method is
remote attestation; the device sends integrity report to
the controller/gateway device for remote validation [155].
A secure firmware update process is then initiated by the
verifier if the validation fails.
7) Penetration Testing/Vulnerability Assessment:
Device Attestation. Periodic device-side code analysis
should be performed to check for the presence of any
malicious code or modification in the original code. The
successful code verification helps in shrinking the attack
surface [15].
Network Testing. Use of penetration testing toolkits
and other vulnerability assessment measures adopted
by ethical hackers to secure the network. The most
common tools are Metasploit, Wireshark, Nmap, So-
cial Engineering Toolkit, Kali Linux, Nessus, etc. The
penetration testing is done to highlight the weaknesses
in the target system. The testing can be performed
on networks, websites, and servers. The weaknesses
are then fixed by installing security patches, improving
security configurations, making changes in the IDS and
firewall rules and security of open ports/interfaces.
8) Cost-Benefit Analysis for the Selection of Suit-
able Security Measure: In this section, we have pre-
sented a defense-in-depth approach for IoT, comprising
various preventive, detective, and responsive measures.
Here a question arises that what about the complexity
and cost comparison of various security measures? In
response to this question, authors in [183] illustrate that
the security requirements of two distinct IoT systems and
even the security features of two different technologies
cannot be compared using a single measure. The secu-
rity measures are adopted as per the technical resources
(computational power, battery life, memory and available
bandwidth) of end devices, and the threat environment.
However, some traditional host-based security solutions
such as anti-virus, frequent security updates/patches,
secure execution environment, OS virtualization, etc.,
are difficult to be implemented on resource constraint
IoT devices. Hence, a relative cost-benefit analysis of
security measures providing same level of security is
essential, to select the suitable technology. E.g., as dis-
cussed in Section-IV.A.(3), allocation of a unique device
identifier is essential to protect against ID spoofing and
device replication attacks. However, just allocation of an
identifier is not enough, the safe storage of device iden-
tity and other associated cryptographic primitives such
as private keys and symmetric keys require additional
measures such as TPM-based keys [155, 156]. However,
any additional security measure comes at the cost of
additional overheads in the form of special hardware, high
computation and energy costs etc.
Similarly, blockchain, a distributed ledger technology, is
recommended to replace centralized cloud platforms.
Both blockchain and cloud store data for further pro-
cessing. Both technologies ensure data authentication
and integrity. But there are few differences that play a
key role in the selection of a suitable technology for IoT.
Cloud services are provided under the centralized control
of one trusted entity. Hence, the cloud is vulnerable to
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TABLE VI:
Comparison of LPWA Technologies
Feature LTE-M NB-IoT LoRaWAN Sigfox
Licensed spectrum Yes Yes No No
Device / subscriber
authentication
UICC/eUICC UICC/eUICC Yes Device only
Network
authentication
Yes LTE-AKA Yes LTE-AKA Optional No
Identity protection TMSI TMSI Partial No
Data confidentiality 128-AES 128-AES Yes(AppSKey) No
Data integrity Limited DoNAS(Optional) Yes Yes
Control signal in-
tegrity
Yes Yes Yes Not known
End-to-Middle
security
No No Yes No
Forward secrecy No No No No
Replay protection Yes Yes (Optional) Yes Yes
Reliable delivery Yes Yes No No
Device updatability Yes Yes Limited No
Keys updatability Yes (Optional) Yes (Optional) Limited No
Updation of long
term keys
Yes (OTA) Yes (OTA) Limited No
Requirement of cer-
tified equipment
Yes Yes Optional Yes
IP network Yes (Optional) Yes (Optional) No No
the single point of failure concerning security and pri-
vacy issues [184] including data manipulation [185, 186],
and the availability of cloud services. Concerning data
manipulation, the cloud service provider has to be the
trusted party as it has control over the data stored in the
cloud and related services. Therefore, the cloud provider
can manipulate user data [186]. Whereas, blockchain is
orchestrated in a way that all the miner and full nodes
in the blockchain network maintain a same copy of the
blockchain state and the trust is distributed among all the
network nodes. Hence, if one device's blockchain data is
altered, the system will reject it, and the blockchain state
will remain un-tampered. Correspondingly, single point of
failure also concerns the availability of the services when
the cloud servers are down because of software bugs,
cyber-attacks, power problems, cooling and other issues;
users find it difficult to access the cloud services [185].
Whereas, in the blockchain, data is replicated on many
computers/nodes and problems with few nodes do not
disrupt the blockchain services. Cloud is also vulnerable
to un-authorized data sharing. E.g., in the recent past,
private data of 87 million users was provided by Facebook
to a British political consulting firm “Cambridge Analytica”
without users' permission [187, 188]. Such a data breach
results in irreversible data security and privacy issues.
Whereas, blockchain with its smart contract technology
gives users the freedom to restrict access to their data to
authorized entities only, without placing trust in any third
party or a cloud service provider [189].
Currently, blockchain is considered to be computational
and energy intensive in the back drop of PoW-based
consensus protocol used in Bitcoin Blockchain. However,
considerable research is being done to design and de-
velop IoT-specific blockchain technologies that infer low
computational and energy costs [190, 191, 192, 193],
are scalable [194, 195] and also offer privacy-preserving
computations on user data [196]. Hence, it is the cost
benefit analysis, the resourcefulness of end devices,
and security requirements that holistically determine an
appropriate security framework for an IoT system/use
case.
V. SUMMARY, LESSONS LEARNT AND PITFALLS
To reach some logical conclusions/lessons and identify
pitfalls concerning IoT security, we have projected a
snapshot of the impact of security provided by one of
the selected real-world IoT technologies on IoT threats
discussed in this paper, in Figure-15. Although, there are
37
Fig. 16: Blockchain for IoT
many IoT communication technologies such as Zigbee,
BLE, RFID, LTE-M, LoRaWAN, etc., that connect IoT
devices with the gateways or base stations. However,
LPWA (Low Power Wide Area) is considered to be a
suitable technology for many IoT use cases due to its
low power consumption, wide coverage, long range, low
latency, reliability, low cost, better QoS, and considerable
security [50, 183, 197]. Therefore, we have carried out
a comparison of various LPWA technologies in Table-VI.
As shown, there are various options for LPWA technology
in both licensed and unlicensed spectrum with varying
security features. However, all of the technologies cannot
be discussed here in detail. Therefore, we have only
mapped NB-IoT security features in Figure-15. Under the
threats sub-section of the Figure-15, the points shown in
red color are the threats/attacks that are not protected
against by the NB-IoT security features. Whereas, the
points shown in the green color are addressed by NB-
IoT. It is evident that NB-IoT protects against the majority
of the transmission/network layer attacks and only a few
perception layer threats. Moreover, the application layer
threats make it essential for the application developers to
embed requisite security measures in the applications. It
is evident from Figure-15 that the cryptographic security
provided by the NB-IoT, cannot protect against device
capture and device tampering. Moreover, there is also no
mechanism to detect any forging or change in the device
code, hardware configuration, and system files. Such
a protection is critical to detect remote code execution
attacks that covert the devices into bots. The pitfalls
observed in NB-IoT security are also shown in Figure-
15.
As shown in Table-VI, LTE-M and NB-IoT operate in
a licensed frequency band, whereas, LoRaWAN and
Sigfox operate in an unlicensed spectrum [183]. Hence,
it is imperative to discuss the impact of a licensed and
an unlicensed frequency spectrum on the operational
performance and security of an IoT system. The main
advantage that NB-IoT has over LoRaWAn and Sigfox
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is that being in a licensed frequency band, NB-IoT is
based on an international standard defined by 3GPP
[51]. Therefore, NB-IoT is mature with good QoS and
is also less vulnerable to interference. Although, the
cost of a licensed frequency band is very high, i.e.,
more than 500 Million USD per MHz, yet, the security
and the performance benefits outweigh the cost effect.
Being operating in a licensed spectrum the end devices
get access to the network after due authentication and
authorization only. Therefore, it is difficult for an attacker
to introduce a forged device in the network. Moreover, a
regulating authority can control and manage a licensed
spectrum with much ease as compared to an unlicensed
one.
On the other hand, LoRaWAN is a non-standard pro-
prietary technology with low QoS and no message de-
livery reliability. Being in an unlicensed frequency band,
LoRaWAN, and SigFox are at high risk of service degra-
dation as the frequency band is shared with a lot of other
radio devices. Moreover, the use of unlicensed spectrum
in most countries is regulated with some restrictions on
the service providers concerning maximum power of the
transmitted signal and the duty cycle. However, still, it is
difficult to control and regulate the unlicensed spectrum
as at times there can be a large number of ad-hoc
networks operating in the said band. Correspondingly,
the limitation on the duty cycle makes it difficult to sup-
port firmware updates over the air [198]. Whereas, IoT
devices without any software updates or security patches
are a security hazard. The brief discussion on the impact
of real-world IoT technologies on the security threats
and the previous discussion on IoT threats and security
framework has led us to draw certain lessons which
further helped us to identify the pitfalls in the current IoT
security environment.
Lessons Learnt and Pitfalls
• As shown in Table-II, IoT threats at various layers
such as physical, MAC/Network and application layer
exploit different vulnerabilities and use different at-
tack vectors to achieve malicious objectives. E.g.,
a device manufacturer leaves some open interfaces
in the device hardware. These open interfaces can
be exploited by the attacker to gain an unauthorized
access to the device and manipulate its operation
[71]. Similarly, jamming of a communication chan-
nel targets availability of the network or network
services. Whereas, anti-jamming protection requires
different approach as compared to merely protecting
against eavesdropping. Hence, attacks at various
layers will have different impact on the overall secu-
rity of an IoT system and will require different security
measures depending upon the IoT use case and
threat environment.
• According to the discussion in Section-II.C, attacks
at physical layer such as device capture, jamming
of wireless channel, hardware exploitation, node
cloning, invasive intrusions, device configuration and
firmware modification cannot be protected only by
cryptographic security provided by IoT communica-
tion protocols. Therefore, security has to be viewed
as a whole and supplementary measures need to
be taken at different layers based on the security
requirements of IoT use cases. These additional
security measures may infer some additional costs
in the form of hardware, software, bandwidth, com-
putation or storage.
• The discussion in Section.II.D infers that depend-
ing upon the type and physical environment of
IoT applications, end devices are vulnerable to
physical attacks including device capture, tamper-
ing, invasive hardware attacks, side-channel attacks,
reverse engineering, sensitive data leakage and
firmware/source code modification attacks [42].
• DDoS attacks are mostly launched through com-
promised IoT devices [65]. Therefore, there is a
requirement of an effective ingress as well as egress
filtering, especially where IoT is connected to the
internet.
• Cyber attacks are considered as one of the biggest
threats to IoT applications [199], and mostly the
network and the application layers are the focus of
the attackers [199].
• No operation in an IoT system can be termed safe
unless the integrity of the code installed on the IoT
device and the integrity of the data being shared
between devices is ensured [9].
• Absence of anti-virus/malware detection mechanism
in IoT is one of the causes of successful attacks
on the integrity of the code/software of an IoT end
device [8, 9].
• Secure firmware update is one of the effective solu-
tions against malware attacks in IoT. However, low
downlink data rate, very short duty cycle and lack
of firmware integrity verification measures make it
hard for an IoT technology to implement an effective
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firmware update mechanism [198].
• Not all IoT technologies’ security protocols meet
the needs of all IoT use cases. Instead, all tech-
nologies have adequate security for some specific
applications. However, if the security provided is not
enough for a particular use case, additional security
measures can be taken but at the cost of some
additional hardware, more computation or bandwidth
cost, etc,.
• Security features of two different technologies cannot
be compared using a single factor/measure.
• The ideal LPWA technologies have some important
security features as optional. These features are
required to be enabled by the network operators.
Hence, the user organizations/network operators
need to have a clear understanding of what security
features they require for which IoT use case [183].
• To effectively provide comprehensive security and
privacy solution, it is necessary to analyze the IoT
application and associated threats. Although similar,
a smart building is different from a smart work envi-
ronment. The solutions, especially the ones involving
classical cryptography and physical layer security
must be tailored for the specific threats. The goal is
to provide a cost-effective solution, while also taking
into account the energy requirement of the various
solutions (many devices can be battery-operated)
[200].
• Mostly, security is not the primary concern while
designing IoT technologies or products. Instead, the
manufacturers focus more on the performance as-
pects such as low cost, low power consumption,
more coverage, high data rate, ease of implemen-
tation and service delivery.
• Standard IT security protocols cannot be deployed
on resource constraint IoT devices. However, se-
lected standard security protocols can be optimized
by removing various optional features.
• Security is a holistic property. Hence, it should not be
considered in isolation. E.g., LPWA technologies are
developed with the primary objective of improving
upon the performance and reliability concerning low
power consumption, wide coverage, long range, low
latency, reliable data transmission, low cost, and
better QoS security [50, 183, 197]. Therefore, some
compromises have to be made between security and
performance of the system. E.g., use of light weight
cryptographic solutions to reduce the computation
overhead and power consumption. Similarly, efficient
use of available bandwidth implies the use of security
measures with less communication complexity.
• Based on the discussion in Section II and Section
IV.A on threats to IoT and guidelines for IoT security
framework respectively, it is deduced that consid-
erable research and development is being done in
both academia and the corporate sectors to mitigate
threats to IoT. These threats fall in the domain of
security triad, i.e., threats to confidentiality, integrity,
and availability of data/information. As highlighted in
Section IV.A, that security has to be viewed as a
whole, and for a defense-in-depth approach against
IoT threats, we need to deploy various preventive,
detective, responsive and corrective security mea-
sures. Hence, Table-V shows that there are many
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) and academic se-
curity solutions available/proposed to provide pre-
ventive, detective, responsive and corrective mea-
sures. For instance, issues concerning device secu-
rity such as device identity [154, 155, 156], tamper-
proofing [154, 160], registration and management
[43], and secure boot [158] have been addressed
by various tech giants including IBM, AT&T, TCG
and Juniper Networks. Similarly, issues concerning
data security and network access including authenti-
cated encryption [168, 169, 170], privacy preserving
computation (homomorphic encryption) [161], se-
cure cloud access [17], mutual device and gateway
authentication [86], and secure network access con-
trol [86, 167] have also been meticulously tackled.
Whenever we talk about cryptographic security, key
management is an associated challenge, and it is
always considered to be an open research issue
[200]. After, device, data, and network security, appli-
cation layer security is also very essential as mostly
the network and the application layers are the focus
of the attackers [199]. Therefore, [89, 154] highlight
threats to IoT systems that rely on websites and
application for service delivery, and also propose
security measures.
However, the constrained resources in IoT devices
and corresponding lack of strong security measures
result in certain short comings that need to be
addressed in future. These include; absence of an
International IoT standards body that should govern
minimal security standards as per sensitivity and
nature of IoT application. Next is, the lack of security
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mechanism to ensure the integrity of IoT devices.
Similarly, protection of IoT devices against malware
attacks and related secure firmware update are still
open challenges. Another critical aspect is that, most
of the data processing and analytics is performed
under the centralized control of a third party/cloud
provider that has to be a trusted one [95]. However,
trust in a single party results in various security
and privacy issues. Finally, more work is required
to be done in intra-cloud and distributed privacy-
preserving data analytics. Similarly, exploitation of
zero-day vulnerabilities, especially at the application
layer, is a persistent threat. Some of these vital open
issues are discussed in detail in the next section.
VI. OPEN RESEARCH CHALLENGES
A. Baseline Security Standards
Because of current lack of standardization on IoT prod-
ucts, diverse IoT applications and heterogeneity of IoT
products, there are issues of security, interoperability and
compatibility. Most of the IoT products are being man-
ufactured without any baseline security standard [27].
Whereas, keeping in view the current threats, there is
a requirement of various integrated security measures
in IoT devices. These measures include requisite user
authentication and authorization, encryption of data at
rest and in transit, hardware security against tampering,
and OS/application security. However, taking into account
the constraint resources of many IoT devices such as
sensors, Arm core or like microcontroller-based devices,
CCTV cameras, Baby Monitors, Home Lighting Systems,
and the high computation and memory requirements for
traditional cryptographic authentication and encryption
solutions, there is a need to develop lightweight fully
optimized cryptographic security protocols for IoT devices
[201]. Application specific functionality vis-a-vis low man-
ufacturing cost and low energy consumption are also
considered to be the limiting factors in developing a gen-
eralized solution for all the IoT products.Correspondingly,
there is a requirement of an international IoT standards
enforcing body to enforce minimum security standards in
IoT products.
B. Privacy-Preserving Data Aggregation and Pro-
cessing
Privacy is a critical security requirement for IoT users.
Although considerable research has already been done
concerning user as well as data privacy, however, certain
issues like privacy in data collection, data aggregation,
data sharing, and data management warrant further at-
tention [23]. E.g., data aggregation is done at the gateway
devices to reduce the communication overhead between
end devices and the cloud/ servers. To preserve data se-
curity and privacy, the aggregation or processing is done
over encrypted data by employing additive [202, 203] or
multiplicative homomorphic encryption schemes. There
are some full homomorphic encryption schemes as well
[204, 205], however, due to heavy computation load, it is
difficult to use full homomorphic encryption schemes in
IoT. Apart from data encryption, users' signatures aggre-
gation is another approach to contain the communication
overhead, given p signatures on p distinct messages
from the same user. However, it is quite challenging to
design a multi-key homomorphic signature to aggregate
p signatures on p distinct messages generated by p users
[103].
C. Software/Code Integrity
Numerous solutions to ensure the integrity of IoT end
devices exist. However, the most dependable solutions
are hardware-based that require execution of complete
attestation process in a secure environment. But keeping
in view the scale of deployment and low cost of IoT
devices, manufacturing of secure hardware-based IoT
products for usages besides critical infrastructure is not a
practical one. Hence, there is a need to explore a secure
software-based solution that can be easily deployed in
resource constraint IoT devices with the flexibility of
timely upgradation. Another foreseeable problem is that
next generation of IoT will consist of a large number of
heterogeneous devices. Therefore, to detect and correct
any malicious software modification efficiently, a swarm
attestation mechanism for large dynamic and heteroge-
neous networks of embedded systems is still a challeng-
ing task [206].
D. Blockchain - An Instrument to Augment IoT Secu-
rity
The success of Bitcoin brought the attention of the
world to its underlying Blockchain technology [162]. The
Blockchain is considered to be an unforgeable digital
ledger that cannot be manipulated and changed. Al-
though Blockchain was initially developed for fintech (fi-
nancial technology), yet it is being adopted by many to
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Fig. 17: Blockchain-based ID Authentication in Fog Computing
provide secure distributed services, such as Hyperledger-
Fabric by Linux Foundation [165], smart city secu-
rity [207], supply chain management [208], data shar-
ing [209], data security [210] and decentralized and
distributed web services [211]. However, Blockchain's
adaptation in IoT ecosystem requires further evaluation.
Figure-16 shows the inherent benefits of Blockchain
in blue blocks, its limitations in pink blocks and the
Blockchain features that can leverage IoT security in
green blocks. The open research issues are shown in
yellow blocks.
Although IoT can inherit some of the core benefits of
Blockchain such as decentralized and unforgeable digital
ledger, transaction integrity and authentication, no double
spending, trustless operation and by design protection
against ransomware and cryptlocker type attacks. How-
ever, to make Blockchain a reliable and secure platform
for IoT, certain aspects need further research and eval-
uation. Such challenges include, identity management
with due consideration for user privacy, user data pri-
vacy (both, on chain and in transit), minimum latency in
transaction confirmation for near real-time IoT systems
(smart vehicles, autonomous traffic management, smart
grid, health monitoring), IoT focused transaction valida-
tion rules, IoT centric consensus mechanism with low en-
ergy, low computation and low communication overhead.
The research on IoT-centric consensus mechanism must
focus on consensus finality and fork prevention, which is
a key to minimize latency in transaction confirmation and
a critical requirement for real-time IoT systems.
E. Challenges to Fog Computing in IoT
One of the challenges in fog computing is to realize
identity authentication while ensuring low latency of real-
time services, the mobility of users, decentralized fog
computing nodes and avoiding de-anonymization attacks
[212]. Currently, there are many identity authentication
schemes [213, 214, 215]. However, they do not cater for
the mobility of the end devices. The probable solution
to this challenge lies in the Blockchain-based access
control for the fog computing. As shown in Figure-17,
all the fog computing nodes can be the full nodes for
the Blockchain and can securely share and maintain the
users' authentication and authorization information using
group keys or attribute-based encryption [216, 217].
Another challenge is the consistency of the access con-
trol policy when multiple devices are used by the users to
access real-time services. The policy may involve device
authentication and management mechanism for the users
and key management mechanism for the fog nodes.
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Although security is an essential part of any IoT system,
however, the limited computational and power capability
of IoT devices, makes it difficult to employ conventional
cryptographic solutions. Hence, there is a requirement to
design lightweight security protocols to support real-time
services for fog assisted IoT applications.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have tried to highlight most of the
known threats to IoT systems by quoting examples of
successful attacks. These threats range from simple
message interception to sophisticated malware attacks.
We have also presented a comprehensive attack method-
ology for most common real world attacks. We also
deduced an attack strategy of a DDoS attack through
IoT botnet followed by requisite security measures. This
paper also presented a comprehensive set of security
guidelines based on industry best practices that can help
IoT standardization bodies to design minimum security
standards based on types of IoT applications and de-
vices. Finally, some open research challenges related to
IoT security were discussed. As for today, the inherent
security provided by the communication protocols does
not protect against malware and node compromise at-
tacks. Moreover, in the backdrop of a recent upsurge in
the number of Ransomware Attacks, the leading cause of
their detrimental effects can be attributed to centralized
network architecture, in which all the network functionali-
ties and security operations are controlled centrally. Such
architectures are costly to set up, and on the other hand,
present a single point of failure.
Hence, apart from other techniques, Blockchain technol-
ogy with its inherent cryptographic security and unforge-
able distributed architecture is also being evaluated and
tested to address the security and privacy issues of IoT.
It is believed that Blockchain can solve most of the data
integrity issues of IoT due to its ability to run distributed
apps in the form of smart contracts and storing data on
multiple nodes. Therefore, we desire to develop a secure
Blockchain-based IoT protocol in future, that would aim
to protect the IoT systems against most of the integrity
attacks.
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